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A fundamental divide exists between what scientists do as scientists and
what courts often ask them to do as expert witnesses. Whereas scientists almost in-
variably inquire into phenomena at the group level, trial courts typically need to
resolve cases at the individual level. In short, scientists generalize while courts par-
ticularize. A basic challenge for trial courts that rely on scientific experts, therefore,
concerns determining whether and how scientific knowledge derived from studying
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groups can be helpful in the individual cases before them (what this Article refers
to as "G2i'). To aid in dealing with this challenge, this Article proposes a distinc-
tion between two types of expert evidence.- framework evidence that describes gen-
eral scientific propositions and diagnostic evidence that applies the general propo-
sitions to individual cases. It then examines the evidentiary implications of that
distinction. Most importantly, admissibility standards for expert testimony should
differ depending on whether experts are proffering framework or diagnostic evi-
dence. Judicial analysis of "fit," expert qualifications, testability, error rates, peer
review, general acceptance, helpfulness, and other traditional admissibility criteria
for expert evidence will often vary, sometimes significantly, based on this distinc-
tion. The Article provides general guidelines about the best practices judges should
follow in sorting through these considerations. These guidelines will permit courts to
manage G2i inferences in a more informed and coherent way than they do currently.
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INTRODUCTION
Fundamental differences exist between how scientists de-
scribe phenomena as scientists and how trial courts expect sci-
entists to describe those phenomena. Scientists, in their profes-
sional lives, almost invariably measure phenomena at the group
level and describe their results statistically. Trial courts, in con-
trast, typically consider cases individually and call upon scien-
tific experts to describe their results categorically. There thus
exists a basic cultural and language gap between what scientists
attempt to do as scientists (that is, generalize) and what they
are often called upon to do as expert witnesses (that is, particu-
larize). In practice, this gap is bridged by courts every day, since
science-based experts testify regularly., But courts are incon-
sistent in how they bridge this gap. Sometimes experts are lim-
ited to testifying to general group-level phenomena, leaving ap-
plication and conclusions regarding specific cases to jurors.2
Other times experts are permitted to apply their knowledge to
an individual case and offer opinions on whether it is an in-
stance of the more general phenomenon. 3 The problem is that
courts rarely provide any explanation for their decision regard-
ing whether experts will be limited to testifying about general
research findings or will be permitted to comment on particular
cases.
1 As Justice Stephen Breyer stated in his introduction to the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter's Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence (National Academies 3d ed 2011), "Scien-
tific issues permeate the law." Id at 3.
2 See, for example, text accompanying notes 58-64. Throughout this Article we
refer to courtroom triers of fact as jurors. Expert-admissibility rules, which are our pri-
mary concern, operate somewhat differently in bench trials. See, for example, Oklahoma
v Tyson Foods, 565 F3d 769, 780 (10th Cir 2009) ("[A] judge conducting a bench trial
maintains greater leeway in admitting questionable evidence, weighing its persuasive
value upon presentation.").
3 See text accompanying notes 65-72.
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This gap between conventional scientific practice and ordi-
nary trial practice involves the challenge of reasoning from
group data to decisions about individuals (an analytical process
that we designate as "G2i"). The G2i challenge has been largely
ignored by virtually all of the participants in the trial process,
including courts, lawyers, experts, and scholars. Yet all applied
science presents G2i issues. Indeed, all expert evidence, whether
based on controlled experimental research or years of experi-
ence, presents G2i issues.4 Experts testify to such matters as the
conditions likely to lead to false confessions, the indicia of schiz-
ophrenia, factors that contribute to eyewitness misidentification,
the cancer-causing properties of benzene, and thousands more.
These are all general-population-based-statements about the
empirical world. They are the "G" of G2i and represent the ordi-
nary perspective of most research and most expertise. However,
in the courtroom, the operative questions pertain to the particu-
lar case at hand, the "i" of G2i: Did the suspect falsely confess?
Does the defendant have schizophrenia? Was the witness's eye-
witness identification accurate? Did benzene cause the plaintiffs
leukemia?
In terms of scientific inference, reasoning from the group to
an individual case presents considerable challenges and, simply
put, is rarely a focus of the basic scientific enterprise. In the
courtroom, it is the enterprise. It turns out that the problem of
determining the allowable specificity of an expert's opinion is
highly complex and depends on a myriad of legal and scientific
considerations. Resolving this problem requires careful balanc-
ing of these considerations as they are presented in specific legal
contexts. As a result, no simple prescription is available. How-
ever, certain guideposts can be identified, ones that recur
throughout expert testimony, thus permitting the development
of a set of best practices regarding when courts should-and
when they should not-allow experts to apply general research
data to particular cases.
In this Article, we set out to develop such a set of best prac-
tices by which courts might manage the G2i issue. Specifically,
our goal is to set forth criteria that will help courts determine
4 See Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137, 148 (1999) ("[I]t would prove diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under which a gate-
keeping obligation depended upon a distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'tech-
nical' or 'other specialized' knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the
others.").
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not only when proffered experts should be allowed to testify
about general research findings but also when they should be
limited to such testimony or instead be permitted to testify re-
garding whether the present case is an instance of the general
phenomenon. In order to accomplish this objective, we first de-
scribe the legal and scientific considerations underlying the G2i
issue in greater detail, then examine how courts today deal with
the issue, and finally set forth criteria by which courts might
handle G2i inferences in a more informed and coherent way
than they do currently.
The major contention of this Article is that expert testimony
focused on the "G" component of the G2i analysis (what we call
"framework" evidence) is governed by different admissibility
standards than expert testimony aimed at addressing the "i"
component of that analysis (which we dub "diagnostic" evi-
dence). The analysis of whether expert testimony is sufficiently
reliable to be admissible should vary depending on whether the
testimony simply reports scientific findings or instead seeks to
address the case at hand. Until courts recognize this point and
grapple with it, they will not be able to make optimal use of sci-
ence's insights.
I. THE G2i CHALLENGE
The basic challenge inherent in reasoning from group data
to individual events is not unique to the courtroom. Indeed,
since all applied science depends on group data to establish
what is known about a phenomenon of interest, G2i issues exist
whenever group data are applied to individual cases. A multi-
tude of fields outside the courtroom could serve as useful illus-
trations. For example, in medicine there is substantial research
regarding the age at which women should begin having annual
mammograms to screen for breast cancer. These data provide an
empirical framework that doctors and patients can use to make
individual decisions and help manage the risks of breast cancer
and its treatment. Although the mammogram research cannot
provide certainty or determine categorically what should be
done in particular cases, it can and often does inform ("frame")
those decisions. Similarly, meteorologists use group data to
model the trajectory and severity of storms. These models help
inform policy makers who must decide whether to evacuate a
community in response to the threat of a particular storm. The
models provide a statistical projection of how similarly situated
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
storms typically evolve. Whether a particular storm is an in-
stance of those storms previously studied, and on which the
model depends, is a probabilistic estimation whose value de-
pends on the variables studied in the original research and the
methods used to study them. Further examples could be gleaned
from virtually any other area of applied science.
In the courtroom, the challenges of G2i are similarly pre-
sented when expert testimony is proffered, and judges must de-
termine daily how to handle them. For example, imagine two
experts, A and B, both of whom want to testify in a trial in
which one of the issues is whether the defendant doctor was neg-
ligent in failing to recommend a mammogram for the plaintiff,
who now has breast cancer. Expert A will testify for the defense
that research shows the optimum age for a woman to get a
mammogram is between forty and fifty (the plaintiff is now thir-
ty-eight). Expert B will testify for the plaintiff that he is aware
of the research, but that in his experience, which includes seeing
hundreds of female patients, some of them with histories similar
to the plaintiffs, the plaintiff should have been told to get a
mammogram at age thirty-five. Should both, neither, or only one
of the experts be allowed to testify? In making this decision
should the court consider the same types of factors, with the
same threshold inquiries, or is a different analysis in order? This
Article sets forth a set of best-practice guidelines that can be
used to answer these types of questions.
A. The Legal Structure of G2i-Framework Evidence and
Diagnostic Evidence
Since it has occasion to use just about every kind of applied
science, the law constantly confronts the G2i issue. Ordinarily,
in criminal and civil trials, science is introduced through expert
testimony and is thought to apply to a factual issue in dispute.5
But, properly understood, neither evidence about the results of
scientific research nor its application to the case at hand is a
conventional trial fact.
Most facts disputed at trial are what Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis called "adjudicative facts."6 According to Davis,
5 Issues surrounding G2i are similarly presented in administrative hearings, and
much of the discussion below could be applied to them. We limit our examination to the
criminal and civil-trial arenas, however, because evidentiary rules often apply differently
in administrative hearings than they do in criminal and civil adjudication.
6 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.03 at 160 (West 3d ed 1972).
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"[a]djudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent."7 Da-
vis contrasted adjudicative facts to what he called "legislative
facts." Legislative facts are those facts that have relevance to le-
gal reasoning and the fashioning of legal rules.8 Davis explained
that "[]egislative facts do not usually concern the immediate
parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide
questions of law and policy and discretion."9 In Davis's original
formulation, jurors primarily found adjudicative facts and judg-
es found legislative facts. 10
Davis's adjudicative-fact/legislative-fact dichotomy is useful
as a starting point, but it does not adequately capture the G2i
issue as it is presented in ordinary adjudication. The general
component of G2i is not "legislative" in any ordinary sense, but
rather is a fact that both transcends the dispute and is relevant
to adjudicating that dispute. At the same time, the individual
component of G2i is not "adjudicative" in the ordinary sense, since
its proof depends on the evidence for the general phenomenon.
In a series of three articles, one of us (J.M.) and Professor
Laurens Walker proposed a better way to understand trial-level
fact finding and, concomitantly, a better way to visualize the G2i
issue in law." They identified a new classification of facts-a
hybrid between adjudicative and legislative facts-that they re-
ferred to as "social frameworks.12 Monahan and Walker pointed
out that social frameworks-or what we refer to here as "empiri-
cal frameworks"13-are a common form of fact-finding in the
courts. As they explained, a fundamental characteristic of much
scientific research is that its relevance has to be understood at
two levels of generality, levels that are analytically separate. On
7 Id.
8 Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 Harv L Rev 364, 424 (1942).
9 Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.03 at 160 (cited in note 6).
10 Id.
11 See John Monahan and Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U Pa L Rev 477, 488 (1986); Laurens
Walker and John Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73
Va L Rev 559, 570 (1987); Laurens Walker and John Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific
Methodology as Legal Precedent, 76 Cal L Rev 877, 879 (1988).
12 Walker and Monahan, 73 Va L Rev at 559 (cited in note 11).
13 Monahan and Walker used the term "social framework" because they were inter-
ested in describing the use of social science research in court. Their approach, however,
is broadly applicable to all science used in court, and so we use the more generic term
"empirical framework."
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the one hand, science is a product of research that applies gen-
erally to all similarly situated cases, and, on the other, it is rele-
vant to particular cases that might be instances of the general
findings.14
The law is replete with examples of this dual use of science.
Consider, for instance, cases in which the court must assess a
criminal offender's likelihood of recidivism, a drug company's li-
ability for a deformed baby, or the credibility of a witness. Ju-
rors trying to assess these claims might want to know whether
mental illness is a risk factor for violence, Bendectin causes
birth defects, and polygraphs validly detect deception. Answers
to each of these questions require resort to an empirical frame-
work that is built on a foundation of research on groups. Expert
explanations of these empirical frameworks may help jurors un-
derstand whether people with mental illness are more likely to
be violent, whether Bendectin increases the risk for birth de-
fects, and how good polygraphs are at detecting deception. Ulti-
mately, however, jurors also need to determine whether, in the
case before them, the criminal offender will recidivate, the plain-
tiffs birth defects were caused by Bendectin, and the witness is
telling the truth. Experts, therefore, might also be called to help
determine whether the case at hand is an instance of the empir-
ical framework.
We refer to the scientist who testifies to the empirical
framework of which a particular case might be an instance as a
"framework expert." Framework experts testify to the "G" in
G2i. We refer to witnesses who apply scientific data to individu-
al cases as "diagnostic experts," because diagnostic means "serv-
ing to distinguish, identify, or determine"'15 or "being a precise
indication.16 Diagnostic experts testify to the "i" in G2i.17 Expert
A in the mammogram case described above is a framework ex-
pert. Expert B in that case is a diagnostic expert.
14 Walker and Monahan, 76 Cal L Rev at 885 (cited in note 11).
15 Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Una
bridged 622 (Merriam-Webster 2002).
16 Diagnostic, Dictionary.com, online at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse
/diagnostic?s--t (visited May 21, 2014). Thus, our use of the term "diagnostic" is broader
than the more common use of the term in medicine and psychiatry.
17 Of course, one expert could fulfill both roles.
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B. Managing G2i
The operative question for courts is how to best manage the
G2i issue. As Monahan and Walker explained in their develop-
ment of the framework concept, the decision whether to admit
expert testimony regarding the empirical framework is separate
from the decision whether to admit expert testimony offering an
opinion that a particular case is an instance of that empirical
framework.18 The most important difference in this calculus is
that diagnostic testimony cannot be admissible unless the rele-
vant framework is also admissible, whereas the converse is not
true. Even if framework evidence is admissible, extrapolation
from it to the individual case may not be scientifically or legally
justifiable.19
Consider expert testimony about the foibles of eyewitness
identifications. Researchers have identified a number of factors
that interfere with eyewitness accuracy, with some affecting the
initial identification, others the memory of the identification,
and still others the elicitation of the identification from its stor-
age in memory. Examples of the first type of factor include
weapon focus and cross-racial identifications, examples of the
second include confounding information received between identi-
fication and recall, and examples of the third include the way
lineups are presented.20 This body of research is voluminous and
robust, sufficiently so to be admissible in the appropriate case.
But, as we describe in more detail below, almost all researchers
in the field agree that the research does not permit an expert to
18 In their early work on "social frameworks," Walker and Monahan proposed that
frameworks be communicated to the jury via instructions. Walker and Monahan, 73 Va
L Rev at 592-97 (cited in note 11). More recently, they have suggested additional proce-
dures by which frameworks could be communicated to juries to include expert testimony.
See John Monahan, Laurens Walker, and Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gen-
der Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 Va L Rev 1715, 1733-37
(2008). While some courts use instructions to communicate frameworks to juries-see
State v Henderson, 27 A3d 872, 928 (NJ 2011)-frameworks are usually communicated
via the testimony of expert witnesses.
19 See David L. Faigman, Making the Law Safe for Science: A Proposed Rule for the
Admission of Expert Testimony, 35 Washburn L J 401, 414 (1996) ("[A]llowing experts to
... apply the science to the case without research supporting their ability to do so invites
expert speculation borne out of expert witness fees or a zeal for the party's cause.").
20 For reviews of scientific studies on eyewitness testimony, see Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Eyewitness Testimony 35-36, 52-109, 136-42 (Harvard 1979); Gary L. Wells and Eliza-
beth A. Olson, Eyewitness Testimony, 54 Ann Rev Psychology 277, 285-89 (2003); Gary
L. Wells and Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Memory for People and Events, in Irving B.
Weiner and Randy K. Otto, eds, 11 Handbook of Psychology: Forensic Psychology 617,
620-27 (Wiley 2013).
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offer an opinion that any particular identification is or is not ac-
curate-whether that opinion is communicated in a categorical
format (for example, "the witness made an inaccurate identifica-
tion") or a probabilistic format ("the likelihood that the witness
made an accurate identification is 27 percent"); thus, these sci-
entists conclude, the research cannot be used diagnostically to
determine whether a particular eyewitness identification was
accurate. If this view is correct, experts should be restricted to
educating the jury about the limits of eyewitness identification.21
Courts are thus confronted with two fundamental options
with respect to the G2i question. They can limit experts to testi-
fying about the relevant framework or they can permit expert
opinions explaining both the empirical framework and its appli-
cation to the instant case. Under the first approach experts de-
scribe general background information, and jurors are left to ap-
ply it-or not-to the respective case at hand. The second
approach permits expert testimony at both the framework level
and its application to the particular case. Choosing between
these options is the core G2i issue. Unfortunately, the courts do
not always recognize that the issue even exists, much less ana-
lyze it properly.
II. THE COURTS AND G2i
Most courts have no general conception of how to manage
framework and diagnostic testimony. As a practical matter,
however, they must regularly decide how case specific to allow
an expert to get. This Part samples the case law in this area
and, more particularly, the statements that courts have made
regarding the scope of proffered expert testimony. This sam-
pling is not meant to be representative, but instead provides a
tableau of cases that have considered whether experts should
be limited to framework expert testimony or instead permitted
(or required) to provide diagnostic expert testimony. Because
these decisions ordinarily arise out of courts' interpretation of
Frye v United States,22 Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
21 The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 explicitly con-
templates this educative function, stating that "[t]he rule [ I recognizes that an expert on
the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of scientific or other principles relevant to
the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts." FRE 702, Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to the 2012 Proposed Rules.
22 293 F 1013 (DC Cir 1923).
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cals,23 and their progeny, we begin with a brief review of those
cases.
A. Basic Legal Standards: Frye and Daubert
Volumes have been written on Frye and Daubert, both indi-
vidually and in comparison to one another.24 It is generally
agreed that the two tests differ substantially in their approaches
to expert testimony, but nonetheless share certain commonali-
ties. This Section does not rehearse these points in detail but ra-
ther discusses Frye and Daubert in terms of how they might af-
fect G2i considerations.
1. Frye.
The basic requirement of Frye is that the "thing" upon
which expert evidence is based must have "gained general ac-
ceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."25 This lan-
guage is famously ambiguous. Among other issues, it leaves un-
clear precisely what must be generally accepted (the general
methodology behind the expert's testimony, the way in which
the expert applied the methodology, or both); how to define the
relevant field; and how many in the relevant field must accept
the methodology for it to be accepted.26
Thus, for instance, if the expert wants to provide framework
evidence about eyewitness testimony, Frye leaves up in the air
whether the court needs to examine not just the acceptability of
eyewitness research generally but also the precise findings the
expert will present. It also leaves unclear whether the relevant
field to be consulted consists of eyewitness researchers who have
done the type of research the expert will describe, all eyewitness
researchers, or all cognitive psychologists, and, if there is disa-
greement about research results (which there often is), the ex-
tent to which that matters. Similarly, if the expert wants to offer
23 509 US 579 (1993).
24 Numerous symposia collect articles from a number of authors on the rules that
govern the admissibility of expert testimony and how they should be interpreted. See
generally, for example, Symposium, The Daubert Hearing: From All the Critical Perspec-
tives, 46 UC Davis L Rev 737 (2013); Symposium, Expertise in the Courtroom: Scientists
and Wizards, 52 Vill L Rev 679 (2007); Symposium, Expert Admissibility Symposium:
What Is the Question? What Is the Answer? How Should the Court Frame a Question to
Which Standards of Reliability Are to Be Applied?, 34 Seton Hall L Rev 1 (2003).
25 Frye, 293 F at 1014.
26 See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v.
United States a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum L Rev 1197, 1215-16 (1980).
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review
diagnostic testimony about the causes of an illness, Frye leaves
unanswered whether the court need only evaluate the accepta-
bility of the general causative theory espoused by the expert or
also must look at the acceptability of the expert's precise evalua-
tion method and reasoning. Nor does it tell the court what types
of doctors and how many of them must subscribe to the expert's
practices.
Frye is not necessarily incompatible with an empirically so-
phisticated use of expert evidence, but the test does not promote
it either. In contrast, Daubert's focus on the methods and princi-
ples underlying proffered expertise has exactly this effect.
2. Daubert.
The basic holding of Daubert, which construed Federal Rule
of Evidence 702's definition of admissible expertise, has three
components, all of which are important to G2i analysis. First,
the expert evidence must be relevant, that is, it must relate to
an issue in the case. 27 The Court referred to this element as one
of "fit," in that the empirical basis for the evidence must address
a fact in dispute.28 Second, the expert must be qualified to testify
on the subject at hand. This element is fairly permissive and can
be met "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."29
These first two requirements can be read into the Frye test as
well, or at least added onto it as friendly amendments. The key
distinction between Frye on the one hand and Daubert on the
other is Daubert's third component, which states that the
"[p]roposed testimony must be supported by appropriate valida-
tion," what Daubert referred to as "good grounds."30 According to
the Court, "the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain
to 'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary
reliability."31
This third prong of Daubert represents a fundamental
change from Frye. Whereas Frye speaks of general acceptance,
Daubert's focus is validity. More specifically, Daubert mandated
27 See Daubert, 509 US at 587.
28 Idat 591.
29 FRE 702.
30 Daubert, 509 US at 590.
31 Id. The Court likened "evidentiary reliability"-which it deemed to be the legally
pertinent inquiry of "trustworthiness"-to what scientists refer to as "validity." Id at
590-91 n 9. The Court clearly stated that "[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evi-
dentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity." Id. In this Article, we use the
scientist's preferred term of "validity."
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that under the Federal Rules of Evidence trial courts have the
responsibility to examine the methodologies and principles un-
derlying proffered expert testimony to determine whether those
principles and methods are sufficiently valid.32 Under Rule
104(a), a court must find this preliminary fact by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 33
Daubert also suggested that, in exercising their gatekeeping
function of evaluating the underlying basis for proffered scien-
tific evidence, judges consider four factors: testability, error
rates and adequacy of standards, peer review and publication,
and general acceptance. 34 According to the Court, the first factor
is important because the scientific status of testimony is tied to
"its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."35 Thus, "a key
question to be answered in determining whether a theory or
technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested."36 The second
factor the Court identified-the "error rate" associated with the
"particular scientific technique"37-was not discussed in detail,
but the Court stated that courts should "ordinarily" also consid-
er this factor, along with the "standards" that exist to control
"the technique's operation."38 The third factor the Court noted
was whether the research "has been subjected to peer review
and publication." 39 The Court emphasized that this factor was
"not a sine qua non of admissibility," but was a "relevant ...
consideration in assessing ... scientific validity."40 Finally, the
Court stated, "'general acceptance' can yet have a bearing on the
32 Id at 592-93 (stating that the trial judge must make "a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and
of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue").
33 See FRE 104(a); Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171, 175-76 (1987) (holding
that determinations of fact under FRE 104(a) must be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence).
34 As we emphasize in the Conclusion, the four "Daubert factors" are merely guide-
lines to help courts assess expert testimony. At the same time, as Justice Scalia pointed
out concurring in Kumho Tire Company v Carmichael, although "the Daubert factors are
not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or another of them may be un-
reasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion." Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael, 526 US 137,
159 (1999) (Scalia concurring).
35 Daubert, 509 US at 593, quoting Karl R. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations:
The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 37 (Routledge 5th ed 1989).
36 Daubert, 509 US at 593 (emphasis added).
37 Id at 594.
38 Id.
39 Idat 593.
40 Daubert, 509 US at 593-94.
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inquiry."41 Lack of "[w]idespread acceptance," the Court observed,
may lead judges to view the particular evidence "with skepticism."42
Two other Supreme Court decisions construing Daubert
need to be mentioned in order to round out the evidentiary pic-
ture. The first is General Electric Co v Joiner,43 decided four
years later. While Joiner is probably best known for its holding
that appellate courts owe deference to a trial court's admissibil-
ity rulings, 44 of most relevance to the G2i issue was Joiner's clar-
ification of the language in Daubert stating that, in carrying out
its gatekeeper role, a trial court's "focus, of course, must be sole-
ly on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate."45 One could conclude that this language was
meant to limit the reach of the district court's responsibilities.
But the Joiner Court observed that "nothing in either Daubert or
the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit
opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the
ipse dixit of the expert."46 This statement suggests that a court's
gatekeeping obligations extend to all components of an expert's
proposed testimony, from the most general to the most specific. 47
After Joiner, the big question involving expert evidence con-
cerned whether Daubert's new rules applied only to "scientific"
evidence or whether they applied as well to "technical and spe-
cialized knowledge," the two other types of expertise mentioned
in Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Several lower courts held that
Daubert applied only to expert testimony characterized as "sci-
entific."48 In Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael,49 the Court rejected
the science/nonscience distinction.50 Justice Stephen Breyer,
writing for the Court, said that "it would prove difficult, if not
impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary rules under
which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a distinction be-
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 522 US 136 (1997).
44 Id at 139.
45 Daubert, 509 US at 595.
46 Joiner, 522 US at 146.
47 Rule 702, amended in 2000, expressly requires, among other things, that expert
testimony be "based on sufficient facts or data," and that "the expert has reliably applied
the principles and methods to the facts of the case." FRE 702(b), (d).
48 See, for example, Iacobelli Construction v County of Monroe, 32 F3d 19, 25 (2d
Cir 1994); Thornton v Caterpillar, Inc, 951 F Supp 575, 577 (D SC 1997); United States v
Starzecpyzel, 880 F Supp 1027, 1041 (SDNY 1995).
49 526 US 137 (1999).
50 Id at 148.
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tween 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized'
knowledge. There is no clear line that divides the one from the
others."'5 Moreover, the Court did not accept the proposition that
jurors would be more impressed by "scientific" testimony than
they might be by other categories of expert evidence. Instead,
the Court stated, all expert testimony has the potential to over-
awe jurors.52
In language that makes no distinction between framework
and diagnostic testimony, Kumho Tire emphasized that Daubert
"imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to 'ensure that
any and all scientific testimony ... is not only relevant, but reli-
able,"'' 53 an obligation that includes "mak[ing] certain that an
expert ... employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectu-
al rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the rele-
vant field."54 The Court extended this special obligation to any
"knowledge [that] might become the subject of expert testimo-
ny," not just of the scientific variety.55 The Court stated emphat-
ically: "And where such testimony's factual basis, data, princi-
ples, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into
question ... the trial judge must determine whether the testi-
mony has 'a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of
[the relevant] discipline."'' 56
Daubert and Rule 702 thus endeavor to empower judges to
screen proffered expert evidence of whatever variety and prof-
fered for whatever purpose. Although debate continues regard-
ing just how rigorous these gatekeeping requirements are, or
should be, there is little question that Daubert and its progeny
changed the terms of the debate.57 As the next Section describes,
in many respects the G2i issue-little noted before Daubert was
decided in 1993-is both a component and a consequence of
Daubert.
51 Id.
52 See id.
53 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 147, quoting Daubert, 509 US at 589.
54 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 152.
55 Id at 147.
56 Id at 149, quoting Daubert, 509 US at 592.
57 Compare David L. Faigman, The Daubert Revolution and the Birth of Modernity:
Managing Scientific Evidence in the Age of Science, 46 UC Davis L Rev 893, 895-97
(2013), with Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of 'Appropriate Validation" in Daub-
ert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist
Tradition, Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 Fla St U L Rev 735, 739 (2003).
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B. How Courts Handle the G2i Challenge
Neither Frye nor Daubert directly addressed the level of
specificity to which they permit or require experts to testify. For
reasons given earlier, we think the basic choice is between
framework evidence alone and framework evidence coupled with
particularized proof. But, to the extent they consider it at all,
courts appear to be inconsistent in how they make this choice
and the reasons they give for it. Below we illustrate this point by
examining court decisions in several different areas of expertise.
1. Eyewitness testimony.
The one scientific area in which courts have often focused on
the divide between the general and the specific is eyewitness-
identification research. The likely reason courts attend to G2i in
eyewitness cases is that research psychologists who testify on
this subject do so. As we noted earlier, eyewitness researchers
are nearly unanimous in conceding that while they have much
to offer in regard to framework testimony, they cannot validly
make statements about individual cases. Two of the most prom-
inent researchers have bluntly stated that "[t]he state of the sci-
ence ... does not permit an assessment of the accuracy of an in-
dividual eyewitness."58 Further, they assert, "any statement that
allows the jury to infer that the expert believes a specific wit-
ness to be inaccurate, whether in response to a direct or hypo-
thetical question, is a scientifically unsupported use of expert
testimony."59
Consistent with this consensus among the experts, most
courts assessing the admissibility of expert testimony about
eyewitnesses demonstrate an appreciation that science begins-
and often ends-from the perspective of studying groups. In
United States v Smith,60 for example, the court specifically held
that the eyewitness expert was "allowed to educate the jury
about the psychological literature," but "was not permitted to
discuss witnesses in this case at all."61 Smith and other courts
have pointed out that by limiting the expert's testimony to fac-
tors that generally interfere with eyewitness perception and re-
58 Brian L. Cutler and Gary L. Wells, Expert Testimony regarding Eyewitness Iden-
tification, in Jennifer L. Skeem, Kevin S. Douglas, and Scott 0. Lilienfeld, eds, Psycho-
logical Science in the Courtroom: Consensus and Controversy 100, 113 (Guilford 2009).
59 Id.
60 621 F Supp 2d 1207 (MD Ala 2009).
61 Id at 1218.
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call, the expert can help jurors appreciate the limitations of
eyewitness identifications without trenching on the jury's role of
evaluating witness credibility.62 As explained by the court in
United States v Hines,63 "[t]he function of the expert here is not
to say to the jury-'you should believe or not believe the eyewit-
ness.' ... All that the expert does is provide the jury with more
information with which the jury can then make a more informed
decision."64
Not all courts follow the lead of the experts, however. Some
courts still insist that eyewitness experts extend their assess-
ments to the accuracy of particular witnesses. In State v
McLean,65 for example, the court stated that an expert's failure
to offer an opinion about the reliability of the witness's identifi-
cation precluded his testimony. According to the McLean court,
the trial judge properly excludes expert testimony on eyewitness
identification when the expert "did not interview the witnesses
in [the] case, did not observe their trial testimony, and did not
visit the crime scene."86 A similar view was expressed by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in State v McClendon,67 which ex-
cluded expert testimony explaining the research relating to the
accuracy of eyewitnesses on the ground that "[t]he jury [must]
have the opportunity to assess the witnesses' credibility on the
basis of what is presented at trial and not solely on general prin-
ciples."68 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has also em-
braced the position that eyewitness experts must apply their
science as nearly as possible to the particular case. 69
These differing approaches to expert testimony about eyewit-
ness identification are replicated in other fields of cognitive psy-
chology.70 They suggest that courts have yet to devise a uniform
62 Id at 1218-19 ("[E]ducating the jury about this research ... is an important step
along the road to using improved scientific knowledge to create more accurate and fair
legal proceedings .... Applying this research to the facts of this case, however, is within
the sole province of the jury.").
63 55 F Supp 2d 62 (D Mass 1999).
64 Idat 72.
65 645 SE2d 162 (NC App 2007).
66 Id at 165.
67 730 A2d 1107 (Conn 1999).
68 Idat 1116.
69 See, for example, Williams v State, 895 SW2d 363, 366-67 (Tex Crim App 1994).
70 Compare United States v Dixon, 261 Fed Appx 800, 802, 804-05 (5th Cir 2008)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defense ex-
pert's proffered testimony concerning the general phenomenon of false confessions, not-
ing that the witness had not examined the defendant and "was not prepared to opine on
whether [his] confessions were false'), with United States v Jacques, 784 F Supp 2d 59,
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approach to G2i issues even when the experts are relatively
clear about the nature of their expertise. The same mixed mes-
sage is found in the courts' treatment of other areas of expert
testimony.
2. Medical and psychological conditions.
In contrast to eyewitness experts, the professions of medi-
cine (including psychiatry) and clinical psychology have long
practiced particularization in ordinary practice. Although their
disciplines are based on general knowledge, both professions
need to make and act upon-that is, treat-individuals with
particular diagnoses. For the most part, courts have, without a
second thought, allowed these experts to provide the same ser-
vice in the courtroom. Thus, for instance, medical experts, prod-
ded by their attorneys, often state that they can proffer an opin-
ion about a particular individual with "a reasonable degree of
medical certainty," and courts are willing to entertain conclu-
sions framed in those terms.71 Psychiatrists and clinical psy-
chologists are usually permitted to make the same types of as-
sertions, and thus often testify, for instance, that within a
reasonable degree of psychological certainty, a particular de-
fendant has schizophrenia and, as a result, was unable to appre-
ciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense.72
Judicial resistance to this practice does occur occasionally,
however. For instance, in the context of testimony by mental-
health professionals, courts have been leery of opinions that rely
on a relatively novel syndrome or theory, such as rape-trauma
syndrome or battered woman syndrome. In such cases, whether
applying Frye or Daubert, courts have either excluded the testi-
mony entirely or permitted only framework evidence, without
allowing application to the specific case.73
63 (D Mass 2011) (reasoning that an expert's diagnostic testimony was inadmissible, as
it would amount to an improper statement regarding guilt).
71 Jeff L. Lewin, The Genesis and Evolution of Legal Uncertainty about "Reasonable
Medical Certainty," 57 Md L Rev 380, 397-406 (1998).
72 See, for example, United States v Grigsby, 712 F3d 964, 968 (6th Cir 2013) (de-
scribing testimony by a mental-health professional that there was a "reasonable psycho-
logical certainty" that the defendant had a mental illness at the time of the offense).
73 See, for example, State v Saldana, 324 NW2d 227, 230 (Minn 1982) (excluding
testimony about rape-trauma syndrome on the ground that "[t]he jury must not decide
this case on the basis of how most people react to rape or on whether [the victim's] reac-
tions were the typical reactions of a person who has been a victim of rape. Rather, the
jury must decide what happened in this case."); Commonwealth v Goetzendanner, 679
NE2d 240, 243-46 (Mass App 1997) (ruling that expert testimony about domestic vio-
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Courts have also been somewhat more cautious about diag-
nostic testimony in "toxic tort" cases involving the causes of cer-
tain types of medical conditions, such as cancer and birth de-
fects. In this particular area of medical testimony, courts
explicitly recognize the G2i issue by distinguishing between evi-
dence of "general causation" (framework evidence) and "specific
causation" (diagnostic evidence) and requiring proof of the first
before permitting the second. 74 Consider, for example, a claim
that the plaintiffs leukemia was caused by exposure to perchlo-
roethylene (PCE), a chemical in dry cleaning fluid7 Virtually all
courts today require credible scientific proof that PCE causes
leukemia in populations exposed to it at dosages comparable to
the dosage experienced by the plaintiff. Only if this general
proof of causation is met do courts permit76 or require77 the
plaintiff to provide additional expert evidence of specific causa-
tion, to the effect that his or her own leukemia was caused by
PCE. Typically in these cases, one or more experts will testify to
the research framework and a different set of experts will testify
that the plaintiffs case is an instance of that framework.78
Because it focuses courts' attention on the methodologies
underlying expert opinions, Daubert has probably spurred the
courts' willingness to distinguish between these different levels
of causation in toxic tort cases. In fact, a computer search we
conducted revealed that whereas only seventeen such cases
made the distinction prior to Daubert, many hundreds did so af-
ter Daubert7 Unfortunately, however, these courts usually fail
lence and battered woman's syndrome in general terms was properly admitted to explain
victim's conduct, so long as the expert did not offer an opinion or diagnosis that victim
suffers from syndrome); People v Christel, 537 NW2d 194, 201 (Mich 1995) (ruling that
an expert may explain generalities of battered woman's syndrome to describe the
uniqueness of particular behavior at issue, but an expert may not offer an opinion
whether the victim was a battered woman).
74 See In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 369 F Supp 2d 398, 401-02
(SDNY 2005) (collecting cases).
75 See, for example, Magistrini v One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F Supp
2d 584, 589 (D NJ 2002).
76 In re Rezulin Products Liability Litigation, 369 F Supp 2d at 438.
77 See, for example, In re Aredia and Zometa Products Liability Litigation, 483 Fed
Appx 182, 191 (6th Cir 2012) ("Because Plaintiff failed to demonstrate an essential ele-
ment of her case, specific causation, the grant of summary judgment was appropriate.").
78 See, for example, Pluck v BP Oil Pipeline Co, 640 F3d 671, 675 (6th Cir 2011) (in
which the plaintiffs hired two experts on the general link between contaminants and
their injuries, only one of whom testified to specific causation).
79 Since Daubert interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the computer search
used Westlaw's "Allfeds" database, using the following search terms: "general /10 causa-
tion and specific /10 causation." This search was run for all cases decided prior to Daub-
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to consider carefully how Daubert should apply to specific causa-
tion testimony; rather, once general causation is proven, they
admit testimony on specific causation relying on the same liberal
grounds seen in more routine medical and psychological cases.80
3. Employment discrimination.
In employment-discrimination litigation involving gender
bias in hiring and promotion, the G2i issue has been highly con-
tentious.81 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc v Dukes,82 for example, Dr.
William Bielby, a research sociologist testifying for the plain-
tiffs, described general research findings on the prevalence of
gender stereotypes in the workplace and the conditions under
which employers are more or less likely to rely on these gender
stereotypes.88 After providing this framework testimony, Dr.
Bielby went on to explicitly link these general research results
to the specific defendant in the case, Wal-Mart, offering the di-
agnostic opinions: (1) that "[s]ubjective and discretionary fea-
tures of the company's personnel policy and practice make deci-
sions about compensation and promotion vulnerable to gender
bias," (2) that "there are significant deficiencies in the company's
ert (June 28, 1993) and for all cases decided after Daubert. The pre-Daubert search iden-
tified 29 cases in which these terms were present. Of these cases, 17 involved substan-
tive discussion of the principles of general and specific causation. The post-Daubert
search identified 797 cases in which these terms were present, with subsequent review of
these cases indicating that 512 dealt with the subject substantively. We further tested
the effect of Daubert by searching the frequency with which courts used the term "differ-
ential etiology," which is the predominant methodology-at least as recognized by courts
today-for reasoning from general causation to specific causation. In brief, differential
etiology is the method by which one putative cause is ruled in via general causation
while other putative causes are sought to be ruled out. The search for this term prior to
Daubert found no federal cases using it. Following Daubert, 116 reported decisions used
this term. An unpublished memorandum reporting this survey is available from the au-
thors.
80 See Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently? Proof of Individual Cau-
sation in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 Brooklyn L Rev 1367, 1374, 1403-04 (2010)
(analogizing the admissibility standards applied to specific causation testimony in toxic
tort cases to the 'liberal" standards applied to forensic testimony in criminal cases and
stating that "this liberal approach unnecessarily helps to perpetuate the status quo").
si Compare Monahan, Walker, and Mitchell, 94 Va L Rev at 1734 (cited in note 18),
and David L. Faigman, Nilanjana Dasgupta, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, A Matter of Fit:
The Law of Discrimination and the Science of Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L J 1389, 1431
(2008), with Melissa Hart and Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework
Evidence in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 Fordham L Rev 37, 59-66
(2009), and Susan T. Fiske and Eugene Borgida, Best Practices: How to Evaluate Psychologi-
cal Science for Use by Organizations, 31 Rsrch in Organizational Behav 253, 269-70 (2011).
82 131S Ct2541 (2011).
83 See id at 2549.
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policies and practices for identifying and eliminating barriers to
equal employment opportunity at Wal-Mart," and (3) that these
deficient policies and practices "contribute[d] to disparities be-
tween men and women in their compensation and career trajec-
tories at the company. ''8
While the Ninth Circuit approved of such diagnostic testi-
mony by research scientists in gender-discrimination class ac-
tions,85 the US Supreme Court did not:
The only evidence of a "general policy of discrimination" re-
spondents produced was the testimony of Dr. William Biel-
by, their sociological expert. Relying on "social framework"
analysis, Bielby testified that Wal-Mart has a "strong corpo-
rate culture," that makes it "'vulnerable' to "gender bias."
He could not, however, "determine with any specificity how
regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in employment
decisions at Wal-Mart .... [Bielby's expert testimony] is
worlds away from "significant proof' that Wal-Mart "operat-
ed under a general policy of discrimination."86
The Court went on to comment directly upon the difference
between expert testimony on general frameworks and expert
testimony on case-specific facts:
Bielby's conclusions in this case have elicited criticism from
the very scholars on whose conclusions he relies for his so-
cial-framework analysis. See Monahan, Walker, and Mitch-
ell, Contextual Evidence of Gender Discrimination: The As-
cendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 Va. L. Rev. 1715, 1747
(2008) ... ("[A] social framework necessarily contains only
general statements about reliable patterns of relations
among variables ... and goes no further. . .. Dr. Bielby
claimed to present a social framework, but he testified
about social facts specific to Wal-Mart"); id., at 1747-1748
('Dr. Bielby's report provides no verifiable method for measur-
ing and testing any of the variables that were crucial to his
conclusions and reflects nothing more than Dr. Bielby's 'expert
judgment' about how general stereotyping research applied to
84 Declaration of William T. Bielby, PhD in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification, Dukes v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Civil Action No C-01-2252, *5-6, 41 (ND Cal
filed 2003).
85 Dukes v Wal-Mart, Inc, 509 F3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir 2007).
86 Wal-Mart Stores, 131 S Ct at 2553-54 (citations omitted).
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all managers across all of Wal-Mart's stores nationwide for
the multi-year class period").87
It remains too soon to tell whether Wal-Mart will sharpen
the distinction between general framework testimony and case-
specific diagnostic testimony in other areas of the law. But the
case demonstrates that the Supreme Court is at least cognizant
of the issue.
4. Forensic identification.
In contrast to the incipient judicial recognition of the G2i is-
sue in cases involving testimony about eyewitnesses, psychologi-
cal and medical conditions, and employment discrimination,
courts have usually ignored the issue in cases involving use of
the physical sciences to identify a perpetrator or victim. Thus,
courts do not question diagnostic testimony from forensic-
identification experts on firearms, fingerprints, and bite marks.
Indeed, such experts very often are allowed to testify that there
is a match "to the exclusion of all other [guns, fingers, or teeth]
in the world."88 In contrast, DNA-testing experts, who employ
the most powerful scientific technology available for evaluating
forensic trace evidence, do not offer conclusions regarding
whether the DNA found at the scene of the crime can be identi-
fied as the defendant's DNA. Instead, DNA experts, and the
courts following their lead, insist on general probability state-
ments regarding the likelihood of finding the "match" randomly
in the population. 89
As these examples illustrate, in identification cases courts
largely adopt, at least as their default position, the respective
professions' own claims regarding their practitioners' ability to
make particularized judgments. Hence, despite the fact that
DNA testing has vastly greater power as a forensic technology
than any other forensic technology now existing, results about
an individual's DNA are expressed with reference to group data,
87 Id at 2553-54 n 8.
88 Brian J. Heard, Forensic Ballistics in Court: Interpretation and Presentation of
Firearms Evidence xvii (John Wiley & Sons 2013). See also, for example, United States v
Allen, 207 F Supp 2d 856, 868 (ND Ind 2002) (footwear identification); United States v
Havvard, 117 F Supp 2d 848, 852 (SD Ind 2000) (latent fingerprints). See also generally
Michael J. Saks and Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Sci-
ence Evidence, 61 Vand L Rev 199 (2008).
89 See, for example, People v Nelson, 185 P3d 49, 64 (Cal 2008) (discussing debates
over various statistical methods of calculating DNA-match probabilities but assuming
that testimony will be formulated on some sort of probability estimate).
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whereas results from many of the other forensic-identification
sciences are presented with particularity and categorically or
without any specific probability estimates.90 Courts do not even
remark upon this differential treatment, much less recognize
that it might be inappropriate.
5. Summary.
This extremely brief survey of judicial treatment of the G2i
issue in a sampling of areas reveals several themes. First, nei-
ther of the foundational cases-Frye and Daubert-directly ad-
dresses the issue, although Daubert's holding, along with Joiner
and Kumho Tire, does provide incentive to investigate the validi-
ty of testimony that goes beyond framework evidence. Second,
courts often do not seem to recognize that every case involving
expert testimony involves a choice between allowing both
framework and diagnostic testimony and allowing only frame-
work testimony; further, even when they are aware of this
choice, as in toxic tort cases, they do not carefully consider the
evidentiary standards that should apply, especially as regards
diagnostic testimony. Third, whether they recognize the G2i issue
or not, courts tend to follow the practice the experts themselves
have adopted, at least when a consensus among them exists;
thus, in most cases, the expert field, not the judiciary, appears to
be dictating whether framework or framework-plus-diagnostic
testimony is allowed.
This deference to professional practice is more in line with
Frye than with Daubert. Frye merely required that the proffered
expert opinion be based on principles or practices that are gen-
erally accepted in the field from which it comes. 91 If professions
such as medicine, clinical psychology, and the forensic-
identification sciences particularize in practice, then their par-
ticularizing would seem to pass muster under Frye, at least if
their professional practice is relevant to (or fits) the legally rele-
vant issue in dispute. Daubert, in contrast, does not place defer-
ence to professional fields at the center of the evidentiary analy-
sis, but instead calls upon judges to independently assess the
methods and principles underlying the proffered opinion in order
90 See National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward 141 (National Academy 2009); Jennifer E. Laurin, Remapping
the Path Forward: Toward a Systemic View of Forensic Science Reform and Oversight, 91
Tex L Rev 1051, 1060 (2013).
91 Frye, 293 F at 1014.
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to determine its reliability. Under Daubert, therefore, simply be-
cause a field claims the ability to apply general research to par-
ticular cases does not make it so. Courts, as gatekeepers, are ex-
pected to determine whether it is so.
The remainder of this Article assumes that courts should
independently assess whether G2i testimony should occur. On
that assumption, we propose a set of best-practice guidelines
that courts should take into account in addressing the admissi-
bility of both framework testimony and diagnostic testimony.
III. ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA FOR FRAMEWORK AND DIAGNOSTIC
EVIDENCE
The courts have not developed a consistent approach to the
G2i problem. However, a perusal of Daubert and Frye and the
cases construing them reveals five criteria that are consistently
identified as necessary considerations in determining the admis-
sibility of scientific expert testimony: (1) relevance, (2) qualifica-
tions, (3) scientific validity, (4) added value (or helpfulness), and
(5) unfair prejudice. This Part explores how these factors apply
to the challenges posed by G2i, differentiating with respect to
each factor between framework and diagnostic evidence.
A. Relevance ("Fit")
As used here, relevance concerns what was called "material-
ity" at common law and what Daubert subsequently referred to
as "fit."92 Relevance, in the sense of fit, is part of but also distin-
guishable from the inquiry into whether expert evidence is help-
ful.93 Expert evidence that is immaterial to, or does not fit, a
proposition in the case cannot be helpful. 94 Rule 702 recognizes
this fact by providing that expert testimony must "help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in is-
sue."95 However, expert testimony that relates to an issue in the
case may still be unhelpful if it is within the jury's common
92 Daubert, 509 US at 591, citing United States v Downing, 753 F2d 1224, 1242 (3d
Cir 1985).
93 Daubert, 509 US at 591 (observing that the language "'assist the trier of fact'...
goes primarily to relevance").
94 Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 3 Weinstein's Evidence 1 702[02] at
702-18 (1988) ("Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the case is not
relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.").
95 FRE 702(a).
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understanding. This Section examines relevance analysis as it
relates to fit; the separate helpfulness criterion is examined in a
later Section.
In the context of expert testimony, the fit requirement has
two different meanings that are especially pertinent to the is-
sues surrounding G2i. The first refers to the traditional question
whether the expert's opinion relates to some specific issue in
dispute. We refer to this as an issue of "legal fit." Legal fit calls
upon courts to determine whether the expert testimony prof-
fered in the case is material to a factual question that the sub-
stantive law requires to be answered. The second variation, one
that is unique to expert evidence, is whether the research basis
for the expert's opinion generalizes to the legal issues in dispute.
We refer to this as an issue of "empirical fit." Empirical fit calls
upon courts to determine whether the expert testimony prof-
fered in the case is based on research methods that relate to the
factual question in issue. Both of these involve the fit between
proffered expertise and the legal issues in dispute, but they re-
quire separate analysis, depending upon whether the expert ev-
idence is framework or diagnostic in orientation.
1. Framework testimony.
The case of United States v Carmel96 nicely illustrates how
both legal and empirical "fit" are important to a court's rele-
vance assessment in a case involving framework testimony. In
Carmel, the defendant claimed that his mail and wire fraud
convictions were a product of his compulsive-gambling disor-
der.97 In short, he asserted that his inability to control his gam-
bling compelled him to commit mail and wire fraud and that his
compulsion rendered him "insan[e]" under applicable law.98 The
basis for this claim was expert framework evidence that people
with compulsive-gambling disorders lack volitional control.
In the course of upholding the exclusion of the evidence, the
Seventh Circuit discussed the testimony in terms of both legal
and empirical fit. The court first observed that following John
Hinckley's attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan, Con-
gress changed the insanity defense and removed the volitional
96 801 F2d 997 (7th Cir 1986).
97 Id at 998.
98 Id.
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prong from the test.99 Because the "volitional prong is the only
basis for an insanity defense based on a compulsive gambling
disorder," this change in the law made any proffered expert tes-
timony on a defendant's gambling disorder irrelevant to a claim
of insanity.100 This part of Carmel illustrates the first, and more
conventional, understanding of relevance or fit-legal fit.
If evidence lacks legal fit, that should usually end the mat-
ter. But in Carmel it did not, because the defendant had com-
mitted his crimes prior to Congress's amendment of the federal
insanity test and the government did not claim that the change
was retroactive. Thus, for the defendant, lack of volitional con-
trol continued to be a material fact in his insanity claim. None-
theless, the court still found the expert evidence to be irrelevant,
this time relying on the fit concern that is special to expert tes-
timony-empirical fit.101 The empirical-fit issue concerned
whether the research available on habitual gambling could be
extended to the nongambling offenses with which the defendant
was charged. Applying Frye, the Carmel court concluded that
this proposition was not generally accepted in the relevant sci-
entific discipline, because "there does not exist the requisite
nexus between compulsive gambling and non-gambling offenses
generally (and mail and wire fraud in particular) for a compul-
sive gambling disorder to serve as the basis of an insanity de-
fense to such offenses."102 With respect to this second variation of
fit, the court determined that research proffered on lack of voli-
tional control could not be generalized to nongambling offenses,
whatever its applicability to gambling.103 It thus was irrelevant
to-it did not empirically fit-the issues in dispute under appli-
cable law.
As Carmel demonstrates, the concept of empirical fit pos-
sesses an element of logical deduction to it, but also merges with
the separate question of external validity. External validity con-
cerns whether the results obtained in a study can be said to hold
for-are generalizable to-groups or populations not specifically
included in the study: in Carmel the research on compulsive
gambling did not generalize to situations involving commission
99 Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 § 402(a), Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1837,
2057, codified as amended at 18 USC § 17.
100 Carmel, 801 F2d at 998 n 1.
101 Id at 999.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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of other offenses to feed the gambling habit.o4 External validity
is to be distinguished from internal validity-what we later in
this Article call "scientific validity"-which concerns whether
the methods and principles used in the research support the re-
sults reached in the study.105
Internally valid framework evidence might have weak ex-
ternal validity for a number of reasons. As in Carmel, it may
simply not address the legal question. Or it may address the le-
gal question, but not in a way that is generalizable to the real
world. For instance, the relevant research might have been con-
ducted in a laboratory setting or in a unique geographical area
that only minimally replicates everyday life in the rest of the
world. It might have been carried out using students rather than
a sample representative of the population of interest. Or it
might have been conducted so long ago that its findings are no
longer pertinent.106 The question of empirical fit asks whether
particular scientific results have external validity with respect
to the circumstances the law makes relevant.
2. Diagnostic testimony.
Relevance, or fit, must also be considered in regard to par-
ticularized expert evidence and, indeed, might play a dispropor-
tionate role there. A diagnostic expert is, by definition, address-
ing the individual facts of the case and thus will usually meet
the legal-fit threshold. But courts must also recognize that fit
may be lacking between the empirically supported basis for the
diagnostician's work outside of the courtroom and the legal
needs of the courtroom.
A now-classic illustration of the possible lack of empirical fit
between what medical doctors do in practice versus what they are
called upon to do in court concerns the difference between what
doctors call "differential diagnosis" and what the courts increas-
ingly refer to as "differential etiology."107 In ordinary medical
104 See John Monahan and Laurens Walker, eds, Social Science in Law: Cases and
Materials 63-64 (Foundation 8th ed 2014).
105 Id.
106 See Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, Quasi-Experimentation: Design
and Analysis Issues for Field Settings 51-54 (Houghton Mifflin 1979) (discussing gener-
alization across persons, settings, and time).
107 For an excellent discussion and citation of authorities contrasting "differential
diagnosis" and "differential etiology," see Justice Brent Benjamin's dissent in San Fran-
cisco v Wendy's International, Inc, 656 SE2d 485, 505-08 (W Va 2007) (Benjamin dis-
senting).
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practice, doctors are interested in, and have been trained in, di-
agnosing disease for the purpose of making treatment deci-
sions.108 Determining, for example, whether a person who arrives
at the emergency department with chest pains has nonischemic
chest pain or acute coronary ischemia is necessary for deciding
proper treatment. 1 9 If the patient receives the latter diagnosis,
however, most doctors do not, and are not trained to, determine
its cause. Yet causation may be the key legal issue for a plaintiff
who claims that her acute coronary ischemia was the result of
ingesting the defendant manufacturer's drug.
The important lesson here is that courts should be clear re-
garding the operative fact in dispute. In the above example, is it
"What is the illness?" or is it "what caused the illness?" More
generally, courts cannot assume that what some professionals
do when they determine that a particular case is an instance of
an empirical framework in their ordinary practice is the same as
what is in dispute under the substantive law.
B. Qualifications
All experts must be "qualified."' 10 Rule 702, however, defines
qualifications broadly. It does not limit experts to those with ad-
vanced degrees, but rather states that a witness can be qualified
as an expert on the basis of "knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education.""' Which type or types of qualifications are
necessary for particular experts obviously depends on the sub-
ject matter of the proffered testimony.112 But it also may depend
upon whether the testimony is framework or diagnostic evidence.
1. Framework testimony.
When determining the qualifications of a framework expert
under Rule 702, the rule's categories of knowledge, training, and
108 See Thomas B. Newman and Michael A. Kohn, Evidence-Based Diagnosis 3
(Cambridge 2009) ("[The reason for diagnosis is to make treatment decisions[;] ... diag-
nosing disease is important for treatment decisions because there are treatments that
are beneficial in those who have a disease and not beneficial in those who do not.").
109 Id.
110 FRE 702.
111 FRE 702.
112 See Lujano v Town of Cicero, 2011 WL 6097719, *3 (ND Ill) (CUltimately, 'wheth-
er a witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in
which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the sub-
ject matter of the witness's testimony."'), quoting Carroll v Otis Elevator Co, 896 F2d
210, 212 (7th Cir 1990).
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education are likely to play a disproportionate role. We refer to
these three categories generally under the rubric of "knowledge,"
since the ultimate purpose of education and training is to impart
knowledge. On the other hand, the other two bases for expertise
noted in Rule 702-skill and experience-are never, by them-
selves, sufficient to support testimony about an empirical
framework.
General knowledge is crucial for the framework expert. Em-
pirical frameworks inevitably transcend one person or one group
of researchers.113 Because science is a cumulative enterprise, of-
ten involving many different research teams and, ideally, many
different research designs, framework experts learn of the work
of their fields primarily through education and training, which
will usually be reflected in the academic degrees the expert pos-
sesses. In most areas of science, an expert's background training
also enables him or her to pursue a lifetime of further education.
Thus courts should expect experts to have an abundant and up-
to-date knowledge of the research in their fields.
The relevance of skill and experience in informing a scien-
tific expert's knowledge of empirical frameworks is much less
clear. Of course, if the expert has conducted the research him or
herself, skill in research methodology is an essential qualifica-
tion. But many framework experts report the data rather than
create them,114 in which case they need only have the knowledge
necessary to critique the research methodology of the studies re-
lied upon.
The role of experience is also ambiguous in the framework
setting. The fundamental value of scientific research that in-
forms framework testimony comes from the fact that it is not
based on one person's subjective experience or judgment. Thus,
modern science puts little weight on the value of inductive expe-
rience for reaching generally applicable statements about some
phenomenon.
But experience can still be indirectly useful to the research-
er. For example, consider the situation of a psychiatrist interest-
ed in studying the alleged phenomenon of repressed memories.
113 See Association for Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 669 F Supp 2d 365, 377-78 (SDNY 2009) (describing the use of multiple research
teams to study the possibility of the correlation between genetics and an increased risk
of cancer).
114 See, for example, Tillman v State, 354 SW3d 425, 438 n 10 (Tex Crim App 2011)
(admitting expert testimony describing eyewitness testimony even though the expert did
not conduct the studies himself).
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As a practicing psychiatrist, the expert might have come into
contact with patients who claim that they have "discovered"
memories that were once "repressed."115 Without a methodologi-
cally sound research agenda, no amount of experience with indi-
vidual patients is sufficient to demonstrate the empirical
framework issue of whether the theory of repressed memories is
valid. The psychiatrist's patients are merely case studies and do
not permit him or her to say whether the underlying phenome-
non truly exists. But the exposure to patients still has value to a
researcher. Together with his or her education and training, it
will allow the expert to better formulate research designs that
can test the posited theory.
2. Diagnostic testimony.
Like framework experts, diagnostic experts must be quali-
fied on the basis of their "knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education."116 But in the diagnostic setting much more em-
phasis is placed on skill and experience than on knowledge
about the nuances of the scientific research. The diagnostic ex-
pert's most important qualification concerns his or her ability to
filter framework evidence through his or her skill set and expe-
rience for the benefit of the jury.
Every diagnostic expert must possess the relevant up-to-
date education and training in the scientific area in which they
will testify. But, in contrast to framework experts, who will focus
solely on the relevant data, diagnostic experts should also have
comprehensive training in forensic issues, because they are
more likely to be asked questions that zero in on legal matters. 1 7
For example, mental-health professionals who seek to testify
about mental state in a criminal or civil case should not only have
certain degrees (an MD in the case of a psychiatrist; typically a
115 See Clark v Edison, 881 F Supp 2d 192, 215 (D Mass 2012) (permitting such
testimony).
116 FRE 702.
117 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 704 experts may give testimony that "embraces
an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." Wade v Haynes, 663 F2d 778, 783
(8th Cir 1981), affd 461 US 30 (1983). Our own view is that ultimate issue testimony
ought to be avoided unless it is clearly based on the "specialized knowledge" required by
Rule 702. See Christopher Slobogin, The "Ultimate Issue" Issue, 7 Behav Sci & L 259,
262 (1989). Be that as it may, diagnostic experts are routinely asked to give this type of
testimony in some contexts. See, for example, Patricia A. Zapf, et al, Have the Courts
Abdicated Their Responsibility for Determination of Competency to Stand Trial to Clini-
cians?, 4 J Forensic Psychology Prac 27, 42 (2004) (finding that virtually all judges prefer
or demand ultimate issue testimony on competency).
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PhD in clinical psychology for a psychologist), but also know the
applicable legal tests (that is, the jurisdiction's insanity formula-
tion or commitment criteria), knowledge which is best gained
through participation in a joint-degree program in law, a foren-
sic residency, or the process of obtaining board certification in
forensic mental-health law.118
Moreover, diagnostic experts are much more likely than
framework experts to need training not only with respect to a
particular body of knowledge, but also with respect to particular
skills. A primary benefit of diagnostic experts is their ability to
gather information that nonexperts, or even framework experts,
would find difficult to obtain. For instance, a medical doctor
knows how to conduct tests that can reveal physical symptoms.
A firearms expert is proficient at measuring striations on a bul-
let or gun barrel. But without training in the requisite skills,
these individuals cannot claim to be diagnostic experts.
Experience is also important for diagnostic expertise, again
more so than with framework expertise. More specifically, expe-
rience in the purported area of expertise is crucial. Focusing on
the mental-health-professional example, neither education
about the relationship of mental illness and crime nor general
experience with evaluating and treating people with mental ill-
ness should be sufficient if the expert is proffered to testify
about insanity. Rather, in addition to the relevant training, ex-
perience with evaluating and treating people who are mentally
ill and charged with criminal offenses should be required.119
C. Scientific Validity
If Daubert wrought a revolution in expert evidence, a key
element of the upheaval was the Court's mandate that scientific
expert testimony "must be 'scientific ... knowledge."'120 This "re-
quirement," the Court explained, "establishes a standard of evi-
dentiary reliability ... based upon scientific validity."121 Thus, in
tasking trial court judges to be gatekeepers, the Court mandated
118 See Gary B. Melton, et al, Psychological Evaluations for the Courts: A Handbook
for Mental Health Professionals and Lawyers 24 (Guilford 3d ed 2007) ("Mental health
professionals should not perform evaluations of competency to stand trial without
knowledge of the standard.").
119 See id at 23-24 (stating that clinicians should have "experience in the relevant
area" and giving examples).
120 Daubert, 509 US at 589-90, quoting FRE 702.
121 Daubert, 509 US at 590 & n 9.
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evaluation of the methods and principles underlying proffered
expert testimony to assure its scientific validity. In order to as-
sist judges in completing this daunting task, the Court in Daub-
ert set forth the factors noted earlier: (1) whether the theory or
technique can be, and has been, tested, (2) whether there is an
acceptable error rate for the evidence and whether there are ad-
equate standards for controlling the technique's operation, (3)
whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer re-
view and publication, and (4) whether there is "widespread ac-
ceptance" of the theory or technique.122 Kumho Tire added a fifth
factor: (5) whether the expert "employs in the courtroom the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field."123 As Daubert itself cautioned,
these factors should not be treated as a recipe that can provide a
definitive solution to every question of scientific validity.124 But
they do anticipate most of the inquiries that arise in connection
with the admissibility of expert testimony.
Two preliminary points should be made before examining
how these factors apply to framework and diagnostic testimony.
First, assessing the validity of empirical framework evidence
will generally be considerably easier than evaluating the validi-
ty of particularized testimony intended to be diagnostic. Most
scientific evaluations of validity are of group effects, not individ-
ual results. Second, as we emphasized earlier, the validity of the
relevant empirical framework is a prerequisite for the admissi-
bility of diagnostic testimony. A particular case that is the sub-
ject of the adjudication cannot be said to be an instance of a gen-
eral framework if the science supporting that framework does
not exist in the first place.
1. Testability.
Testability is the sine qua non of basic science. On this
point, the Daubert Court cited "the philosopher of science Karl
Popper, who asserted that testability distinguishes scientific
statements from pseudoscientific or nonscientific statements.125
122 Id at 592-94.
123 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 152.
124 Daubert, 509 US at 594 ('The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one.").
125 The criterion of falsifiability provides that "[a] statement or theory is ... falsifia-
ble if and only if there exists at least one potential falsifier-at least one possible basic
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As the Court noted, Popper believed that "[t]he criterion of the
scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or
testability."126 The hallmark of scientific statements is that they
are vulnerable to refutation. They also permit what Popper
called intersubjective testability, which modern scientists might
refer to simply as replication.127
a) Testability and framework testimony. Daubert stated
that the research hypotheses upon which expert testimony is
based must not only be testable, but must also have been ade-
quately tested.128 Testing in science comes in myriad forms,
ranging from highly controlled laboratory experiments to quali-
tative interviews. Very often, disparate methodologies are em-
ployed to test the same basic hypothesis. For example, the hy-
pothesis that silicone implants can cause autoimmune illnesses
was tested using multiple methods, including at the cellular lev-
el, employing laboratory animals, and by epidemiological meth-
ods on human populations.129 Indeed, a key consideration in as-
sessing the adequacy of the testing is whether different
research methods were used and whether they converged on
the same answer. 130
Thus, courts judging validity in a given case will often find
that they need to assess numerous studies of various types. Con-
sider, for example, the question whether violent video games can
cause children to be violent. The hypothesis that there is a caus-
al connection between violent media and increased violence of
children has been the subject of considerable research attention
using widely varying methods, including observational studies,
statement that conflicts with it logically." Karl Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science
xx (Rowman and Littlefield 1983) (W.W. Bartley III, ed).
126 Daubert, 509 US at 593, quoting Popper, Conjectures and Refutations at 37 (cited
in note 35).
127 Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery 44 (Basic Books 1961). See also
Jason M. Chin, Psychological Science's Replicability Crisis and What It Means for Sci-
ence in the Courtroom, Psychology, Pub Pol & L (forthcoming 2014), online at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2412985 (visited May 21, 2014).
128 Daubert, 509 US at 593 ("[A] key question to be answered in determining wheth-
er a theory or technique is scientific knowledge [is] ... whether it can be (and has been)
tested.") (emphasis added). See also, for example, Miller v Pfizer, Inc, 196 F Supp 2d
1062, 1072 (D Kan 2002) (dismissing an expert's hypothesis-that the drug Zoloft induc-
es suicidal ideation-because it was testable but had not been adequately tested).
129 See generally Jack W. Snyder, Silicone Breast Implants, 18 J Legal Med 133
(1997) (describing these and other types of studies).
130 This principle is referred to as "convergent validity." See William R. Shadish,
Thomas D. Cook, and Donald T. Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental De-
signs for Generalized Causal Inference 350 (Houghton Mifflin 2d ed 2001).
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behavioral experiments, and brain imaging.'31 Courts confront-
ing an expert opinion that violent video games can cause in-
creased violence should have to consider the weight of all of this
evidence before making an admissibility decision.132
One conceptualization of the weight-of-the-evidence ap-
proach in the context of determining causation at the level of
empirical frameworks comes from Austin Bradford Hill. 33 Hill
described a set of nine factors that can assist scientists (and
thus courts) in making judgments regarding general causa-
tion.134 The Hill guidelines, and more generally the use of a
"weight of the evidence" methodology, have gained some traction
among courts.135
This is a good trend. However, weight-of-the-evidence meth-
ods are also elastic and prone to strategic misuse. As Professors
David Kaye, David Bernstein, and Jennifer Mnookin have ex-
plained, this method requires courts to examine "[t]he nature of
the studies in each case, the plausibility of the extrapolations
from them, and the known soundness of the basic theory-in
sum, the expert's causal reasoning ... ."136 Unfortunately, courts
sometimes use the weight-of-the-evidence phraseology with no
substantive evaluation of the evidence, much less any explanation
131 See generally Christopher J. Ferguson, Violent Video Games and the Supreme
Court, 68 Am Psychologist 57 (2013).
132 This lesson was on display in Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 131
S Ct 2729, 2739 (2011) (dismissing studies purporting to indicate a connection between
exposure to violent video games and harmful effects on children because they merely
"show at best some correlation between exposure to violent entertainment and minuscule
real-world effects, such as children's feeling more aggressive or making louder noises in
the few minutes after playing a violent game than after playing a nonviolent game").
133 Austin Bradford Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation,
58 Proceedings Royal Socy Med 295 (1965). See also Thomas A. Glass, et al, Causal In-
ference in Public Health, 34 Ann Rev Pub Health 61, 63 (2013).
134 The nine factors he identified are (1) temporal relationships (in other words, if A
is thought to cause B, A must precede B); (2) strength (that is, the stronger the associa-
tion the more likely it is cause and effect); (3) dose-response (that is, causation gains
support if the higher the dose the greater the effect); (4) consistency (that is, results are
consistent across methods); (5) plausibility (that is, the mechanism believed to underlie
causation is plausible); (6) consideration of alternative explanations (that is, other causes
for the effect have been ruled out); (7) experiment (that is, causation judgments are
higher if the research used experimental designs); (8) specificity (that is, the effect is
specific to the putative cause); and (9) coherence (that is, the relationship is consistent
with other research findings in the field). Hill, 58 Proceedings Royal Socy Med at 295-99
(cited in note 133).
135 See Dunn v Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp, 275 F Supp 2d 672, 678-79 (MD
NC 2003).
136 David H. Kaye, David E. Bernstein, and Jennifer L. Mnookin, The New Wigmore:
A Treatise on Evidence: Expert Evidence § 10.5.1 at 98 (Aspen Supp 2013).
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of its weight. 137 Experts should be required to do more than
simply assert the mantra "weight of the evidence." They must
specifically explain the component parts of the research evidence
advanced to support their testimony and specify the weight they
have accorded to each part.
b) Testability and diagnostic testimony. Testing the basis of
diagnostic testimony is often a difficult enterprise, because by
definition such testimony is always specific to a particular case.
While a diagnostic opinion can certainly be informed by research
and the confidence level associated with it can sometimes even
be quantified, ultimately whether it is reliable in the legal sense
can be tested only through some sort of feedback loop that indi-
cates whether the expert was right or wrong. As Professors Dan-
iel Kahneman and Gary Klein advise, intuitive expertise can be
developed only in environments that have "high validity" (that
is, useable outcome measures) and provide "an adequate oppor-
tunity to practice the skill" through repetitive trials. 138
Some diagnostic experts enjoy readily accessible feedback
loops. For instance, diagnostic experts in various forensic
fields-including handwriting, fingerprinting, and ballistics-
can be subjected to proficiency testing, which measures their
ability to identify correctly the relevant forensic product under a
number of different scenarios. 139 The value of this testing, of
course, depends on how closely it approximates the task at hand
that is disputed in the courtroom. Similarly, the reliability and
validity of various diagnostic instruments-ranging from
breathalyzers and radar guns used by police to psychological
tests and brain scans used by clinicians-must be established
through testing and be recalibrated or renormed on a periodic
basis. 4o In evaluating the validity of testimony from experts,
137 See, for example, Milward v Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc, 639 F3d 11,
17-26 (1st Cir 2011), cert denied, 132 S Ct 1002 (2012) (reversing the district court ex-
clusion of general causation expert testimony as an abuse of discretion, because experts
claimed to use "weight of the evidence" methodology). See also David L. Faigman, et al, 3
Modern Scientific Evidence: The Law and Science of Expert Testimony § 29:6 at 2-3
(West 2013) (criticizing Milward for confusing inference with a scientific methodology).
138 Daniel Kahneman and Gary Klein, Conditions for Intuitive Expertise: A Failure
to Disagree, 64 Am Psychologist 515, 520 (2009).
139 For examples of such testing in the forensic arena, see Joseph L. Peterson, et al,
Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Research Program 188-89 (National Institute of
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice 1978). See also Florida v Harris, 133 S Ct 1050,
1058-59 (2013) (discussing methods of conducting proficiency testing on drug-sniffing dogs).
140 See, for example, John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Christopher Seeds,
Of Atkins and Men: Deviating from Clinical Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death
2014]
The University of Chicago Law Review
gatekeeping courts should assess the expert's success rate on, or
the methodology of, these tests, When they exist.
Many diagnostic experts, however, cannot routinely test
their conclusions in a given case in a scientific manner. For in-
stance, consider an auto mechanic who testifies, based on his
training and experience with Fords, that a fire in the Ford driv-
en by the plaintiffs was probably the result of an oil leak onto
the exhaust manifold when the driver braked hard. Assuming
the fire destroyed the car, the mechanic cannot verify the accu-
racy of his testimony, and replicating the conditions of the fire is
not possible. Or consider a psychiatrist who testifies in an insan-
ity trial that, based on his experience evaluating people with se-
rious mental illness, the defendant was substantially unable to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Unfortunately, there
is no gold standard for insanity; insanity, and whether a per-
son's appreciation of wrongfulness was "substantial" in a partic-
ular case, is simply what the jury says it is, and thus the expert
cannot know, in any absolute sense, whether the opinion is "cor-
rect."141 Next assume that a diagnostic expert opines that a par-
ticular convicted offender is a high risk for committing another
crime in the near future. If the court agrees, the individual will
be incarcerated or treated or both. Once again, the feedback loop
is compromised. The outcome variable here (reoffending) is nei-
ther amorphous (as with insanity) nor difficult to ascertain (as it
is with respect to the cause of car fires). But because of the inter-
vention by the court, the law prevents a falsification procedure.
These examples illustrate the difficulty of measuring in a
scientific way the methodology or opinions of diagnostic exper-
tise in many types of cases. The necessary feedback loops simply
do not exist. However, a diagnostic expert can at least attend to
the process of accumulating and analyzing the relevant infor-
mation. As developed further below, whether the expert follows
the approved process can be a form of testing.
Penalty Cases, 18 Cornell J L & Pub Pol 689, 700-01 (2009) (discussing the renorming of
IQ tests for determining whether a person is intellectually disabled for death-penalty
purposes).
141 See generally Douglas Mossman, Dustin B. Wygant, and Roger 0. Gervais, Esti-
mating the Accuracy of Neurocognitive Effort Measures in the Absence of a "Gold Stand-
ard," 24 Psychological Assessment 815 (2012). As one court stated, "Legal tests of crimi-
nal insanity are not and cannot be the result of scientific analysis or objective judgment.
There is no objective standard by which such a judgment of an admittedly abnormal of-
fender can be measured." Sauer v United States, 241 F2d 640, 648 n 27 (9th Cir 1957),
quoting Holloway v United States, 148 F2d 665, 666 (DC Cir 1945).
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2. Error rates and adequate standards.
In Daubert, the Court stated that "in the case of a particular
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider the
known or potential rate of error ... and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's opera-
tion."142 The concept of error--or unexplained variance-is cen-
tral to both the general scientific research that informs frame-
work testimony and the particular scientific techniques that
might be employed to offer diagnostic testimony. Indeed, in sci-
ence, error--conceptualized as what is yet unknown-fuels the
scientific enterprise itself. While analysis of the "standards"
maintained by the relevant discipline is a distinct issue, it is
closely connected to the error-rate factor and will also be dis-
cussed here.
a) Error rates and standards in framework testimony. In-
herent in the testability factor is an error rate. At the general
level of science, the notion of error is not strictly reducible to a
single "rate" or number. Yet error is an abiding consideration in
scientific research. 143 Assume, for instance, an attempt to ascer-
tain the toxic effects of Substance X. For ethical reasons a pro-
spective randomized study of X's toxic effects can be tested only
on animals, which introduces the type of error we earlier dis-
cussed in connection with empirical fit. An alternative research
method, epidemiological study of X's effects on humans who
have previously been exposed to it, introduces error because it
occurs without random assignment, and could also encounter
problems associated with inadequate sample size or inadequate
comparison groups (that is, groups that have not been exposed
to X).144 Also, errors in research can have random or systematic
effects. Random error would occur, for example, if researchers
made mistakes in coding their data, such as recording that sub-
jects given an experimental drug were given a placebo, and vice
versa.145 In contrast, systematic errors produce bias in a single
142 Daubert, 509 US at 594 (citations omitted). Although the Court mentioned error
rates only briefly, this factor has become integral to the Daubert analysis and a consid-
erable legal literature has been devoted to it. See generally D. Michael Risinger, Whose
Fault?-Daubert, the NAS Report, and the Notion of Error in Forensic Science, 38 Ford.
ham Urban L J 519 (2010).
143 See Shadish, Cook, and Campbell, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental De-
signs at 401-04 (cited in note 130).
144 Id at 13-18.
145 Id at 401-02.
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direction.146 For example, if researchers rely on self-reports of
exposure to X, and if some of the people asked are ill, "recall bi-
as" about whether and when such exposure took place can
arise.147
As its linkage in Daubert suggests, the extent to which the
relevant discipline maintains standards for evaluating the valid-
ity of its research techniques is closely associated with error
rates. For example, most scientists consider a finding of differ-
ences in values (effect size) to be statistically significant if the
result is demonstrably likely to occur by chance only one in
twenty times, assuming no differences exist (that is, the null
hypothesis is true).148 The significance of statistically significant
results can also be analyzed statistically, through conventions
that determine whether a given effect size is small, medium, or
large.149 Using Daubert's language, the significance of error rates
can be evaluated in standard ways. Consider for example, a
study that shows that, on a 5-point scale measuring ability to
make appropriate prosocial judgments, juveniles who are 16
years of age score 2.77 on average while adults score on average
3.1, a result that, if valid, could be important in deciding the re-
sponsibility of juvenile offenders.150 For this difference to be val-
id, however, statistical analysis must first show that the likeli-
hood of obtaining this difference was 5 percent or less. Further,
even assuming the difference is statistically significant, one
might still want to know whether the effect size is considered
small, medium, or large as a statistical matter, to provide some
measure of whether the statistically significant results are of
any practical significance.
Courts must be attuned to these methods of evaluating the
worth of framework evidence, even if it means wading into un-
familiar statistical waters. Without error-rate information
146 Id at 410-13.
147 Karen Raphael, Recall Bias: A Proposal for Assessment and Control, 16 Intl J
Epidemiology 167, 167 (1987).
148 Unfortunately, some experts, and therefore courts, erroneously interpret this
finding to mean that the "error rate" is 5 percent. See David Faust, et al, The Admissibil-
ity of Behavioral Science Evidence in the Courtroom: The Translation of Legal to Scien-
tific Concepts and Back, 6 Ann Rev Clinical Psychology 49, 73 (2010).
149 See Jacob Cohen, A Power Primer, 112 Psychology Bull 155, 157 (1992) (suggest-
ing benchmarks for interpreting Cohen's d effect sizes of .20 (designated a small effect
size), .50 (medium), and .80 (large)).
150 See Elisabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable than Adults, 18 Behav Sci & L 741,
752 (2000) (reporting these results).
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Daubert's command that courts evaluate the reliability of expert
evidence cannot be accomplished, at least when an empirical
framework is involved.
b) Error rates and standards in diagnostic testimony. Error-
rate information is also sometimes available in connection with
diagnostic testimony, especially when it is predicated on some
type of instrument. For example, the Classification of Violence
Risk (COVR), a software program that provides an actuarial vio-
lence-risk assessment that can be used to inform diagnostic tes-
timony in civil-commitment cases, yields a prediction of violent
behavior, as well as a statement of the confidence with which
this prediction can be taken. An illustrative output from this in-
strument would be: Based on the data used to construct the
Classification of Violence Risk, one can say with 95 percent con-
fidence that between 20 and 32 percent of persons with the same
score as [person's name] can be expected to commit a violent act
toward another person in the next several months, with a best
estimate of 26 percent.' 5'
With other types of diagnostic testimony, error rates cannot
be generated through the types of large-scale studies that re-
sulted in the COVR. That does not mean that error rates cannot
be determined in such situations, however. For instance, in
Kumho Tire, the Court stated that, "[i]n certain cases, it will be
appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for example, how often an
engineering expert's experience-based methodology has pro-
duced erroneous results . . . 152With this language, the Court
recognized that error rates can sometimes be obtained even in
cases in which diagnostic testimony is based on the expert's
purported knowledge alone; the expert can, for instance, simply
keep track of his or her own success rate in the types of cases at
issue.
However, as noted in our discussion of the testability factor,
diagnostic expertise is not always amenable to even this type of
verification process. Thus, diagnostic experts will not always be
able to provide anything resembling error-rate information. In
151 See John Monahan, et al, Rethinking Risk Assessment: The MacArthur Study of
Mental Disorder and Violence 126-27 (Oxford 2001). See also Nicholas Scurich, John
Monahan, and Richard S. John, Innumeracy and Unpacking: Bridging the Nomothet-
ic/Idiographic Divide in Violence Risk Assessment, 36 L & Human Behav 548, 552 (2012)
(reporting research on violence-risk assessment "asking empirically under what circum-
stances people apply group-level (i.e., actuarial) estimates to an individual member of
the group").
152 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 151.
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such cases, the process by which experts arrive at their conclu-
sions-what Daubert called "standards [for] controlling the
technique's operation" and what we will call "protocols"15a-can
be subject to study, and, as a result, a form of error rate can be
generated.
For instance, violence-risk-assessment guides tell clinicians
the factors that studies have found are most strongly related to
violence; if a diagnostic expert fails to consider those risk factors
(such as age, gender, and prior violence), error can be said to
have occurred. Similarly, in cases involving medical issues, pro-
fessionals can identify best practices for conducting evaluations,
and an expert's failure to follow the approved structured format
could be viewed as a type of error, with the number of depar-
tures constituting the error rate.154 This type of case-specific er-
ror-rate analysis would be particularly relevant for a court at-
tempting to ascertain whether the expert has followed an
adequate evaluation procedure and is thus qualified to testify in
the particular case.
How are these procedures-or, in diagnostic terminology,
protocols-to be developed? In some instances of diagnostic ex-
pertise, researchers can assist in this endeavor. Protocols that
can be subjected to scientific testing, such as, for example, poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) methods that generate DNA pro-
files, can be tested and retested by cross-validating them on new
sample populations. That process can fine-tune the appropriate
standards to follow.
Protocols that cannot be easily subjected to scientific testing
require a different approach to standard-setting. One obvious
method is to place the burden on the relevant professional or-
ganizations to devise best-practice evaluation procedures. The
Social Security Administration has developed a highly struc-
tured method of assessing disability for the purpose of determin-
ing benefits eligibility.55 The medical profession has established
protocols for conducting various types of tests, ranging from
mammograms to brain scans, 156 and in mental health there are
153 Daubert, 509 US at 594, citing United States v Williams, 583 F2d 1194, 1198 (2d
Cir 1978).
154 See Robert G. Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations in Litigation Reform,
86 BU L Rev 1155, 1160 (2006) ("Procedure reduces ... the number of errors and thus
the total harm that the system's errors create.").
155 See generally 20 CFR § 404.1505 et seq.
156 See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J Health Polit Pol & L 327, 343 (2001).
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well-accepted protocols for conducting child-custody and insanity
evaluations and structured instruments for evaluating the risk
of an offender.157 These types of best-practice, or evidence-based,
standards should be highly relevant to the admissibility decision
in diagnostic-evidence cases. 158
3. Peer review and publication.
The expectation that research has been published in a peer-
reviewed journal is one shared by most mainstream scientists.
But many fields on which courts rely-including the legal acad-
emy-do not share this view, and it must also be recognized that
peer review can occur outside the publication process. Various
versions of the peer review dynamic can be seen both in general
fields of inquiry that inform framework testimony and in the
particularized judgments that might be introduced in court as
diagnostic testimony.
a) Peer review and publication in framework testimony. The
basis for framework evidence should usually be accessible in a
peer-reviewed journal.59 But not all peer-reviewed journals are
equal in status. Scientists judge the quality of scholarship, in part,
by the selectivity of the journal in which it appears. This factor
should be important for judges to consider too.16o Yet, at the same
time, peer review is no panacea, and many articles that survive it
turn out to be invalid in time. Further, conventional scientific jour-
nals likely tend toward publishing conventional scientific research,
157 See, for example, Kirk Heilbrun, Thomas Grisso, and Alan M. Goldstein, Foun-
dations of Forensic Mental Health Assessment 5-10 (Oxford 2009); Thomas Grisso, Fo-
rensic Evaluation of Juveniles 153 (Professional Resource 1998); Jennifer L. Skeem and
John Monahan, Current Directions in Violence Risk Assessment, 20 Curr Dir in Psycho-
logical Sci 38, 39 (2011).
158 See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medi-
cine, 44 Ariz St L J 1165, 1216-24 (2012) (reporting the extent to which medical evi-
dence-based guidelines have influenced court decisions and describing the difficulties
with ensuring the guidelines are based on good, up-to-date data). See also Christopher
Slobogin, Proving the Unprovable: The Role of Law, Science, and Speculation in Adjudi-
cating Culpability and Dangerousness 64-71 (Oxford 2007) (describing and analyzing a
proposal by Professor Daniel Fishman for establishing a computer-based method of ac-
cumulating psychological cases studies that can be used to hone procedures and estab-
lish professional standards).
159 The prestigious journal Nature has an excellent description of the peer review
process on its website. See Peer-Review Policy (Nature Publishing Group 2013), online at
http://www.nature.com/authors/policies/peer-review.html (visited May 21, 2014).
160 See, for example, Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc, 43 F3d 1311,
1318 (9th Cir 1995) (noting the absence of publications by the plaintiffs' expert in scien-
tific journals).
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thus limiting the volume of revolutionary findings to be found in
them. These considerations, on balance, support the Daubert Court's
conclusion that peer review and publication is an important factor in
assessing admissibility, but not a prerequisite to it.161
In considering the quality of the journals in which empirical
framework information appears, judges would be well-advised to
return to the first two factors the Daubert Court identified, test-
ing and error rate. Publication in journals that do not share the
values reflected in these first two factors should alert judges
that the research must be scrutinized with particular care. To be
sure, just as the Court did not establish publication as a prereq-
uisite to admissibility, so too publication in nonrigorous jour-
nals-or, even, in student- (rather than peer-)edited law re-
views162--should not mean per se exclusion. But in both cases
judges should use extreme caution before admitting testimony
relying on them.
The principle of peer review can also be understood much
more broadly, and more fundamentally, than merely getting a
research study published. In Daubert, the Court observed that
"submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a com-
ponent of 'good science,' . . . because it increases the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected."163 In
practice, this aspect of peer review-detecting serious flaws in
the design of studies-is not restricted to the evaluation of jour-
nal reviewers. It is the culture of science and thus also takes
place before research is conducted (such as when a funding
agency evaluates research proposals) and continues well past
publication. Indeed, most of the "scrutiny of the scientific com-
munity"164 takes place after publication. That is why Daubert's
discussion of peer review and publication takes pains to alert
courts to the fact that publication in a peer-reviewed journal is no
assurance of the soundness of a finding, and the lack of publication
is no assurance that a study and its findings are not sound.165
161 Daubert, 509 US at 593-94 (recognizing that publication "does not necessarily
correlate with reliability," but is nonetheless a "relevant ... consideration in assessing
the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion is
premised.").
162 See, for example, Cicero v Borg-Warner Automotive, Inc, 163 F Supp 2d 743, 747-
48 (ED Mich 2001) (noting that proffered expert, a law professor, had published only in
student-edited law reviews). See also Shari Seidman Diamond and Pam Mueller, Empir-
ical Scholarship in Law Reviews, 6 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 581, 592-93 (2010).
163 Daubert, 509 US at 593 (citations omitted).
164 Id.
165 See id at 594.
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b) Peer review and publication in diagnostic testimony.
While diagnostic expertise is particularized to the case and thus
is not normally the subject of a published report (at least prior to
adjudication), it can nonetheless be subject to a version of peer
review. Indeed, the classic form of peer review is the second
opinion. Ensuring that a colleague agrees with one's diagnostic
assessment, or at least the method of arriving at it, can provide
some assurance of validity.166
The use of second opinions as a peer review mechanism
must be approached with caution, however. Second opinions are
sometimes overeagerly touted as a form of peer review in vari-
ous forensic-identification fields, including, among others, la-
tent-fingerprint identification. Indeed, the basic methodology in
latent-print analysis contains four stages, one of which (Verifica-
tion) is explicitly a double-check stage that follows Analysis,
Comparison, and Evaluation of an unknown print (thus the en-
tire process is give the acronym ACE-V).167 Critics of the ACE-V
method question whether verification operates in practice as
well as it is idealized in theory.168 For instance, verifiers in the
forensic sciences typically consider only the one comparison they
are given (in other words, the conclusion reached by the original
analyst), they know the identity of that analyst, and they have
background case information regarding the comparison in ques-
tion.169 Thus, like peer review and publication, courts should en-
sure that diagnostic second opinions (or verifications) are effec-
tive. They should confirm that these reviews are not mere
rubber stamps of the original finding and are not overly influ-
enced by knowledge of the identity of the preceding analysts or
biased by extraneous background information.
Peer review of a diagnostic opinion via publication is also
possible, at least ex post, in a way that can aid future diagnostic
experts. For instance, case studies can be described in journals
that publish only articles vetted by other professionals. Ideally,
166 See Rey v Texas, 897 SW2d 333, 338 (Tex Crim App 1995) (holding that patholo-
gy, in general, and psychiatry in particular, are both subspecialties of medicine that are
not exact science like mathematics and therefore, there is a need for a second opinion).
167 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, et al, The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic
Sciences, 58 UCLA L Rev 725, 734-35 (2011); National Research Council, Strengthening
Forensic Science at 137-38 (cited in note 90).
168 See Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J L & Pol 143, 178 (2005) ("ACE-V
is an acronym, not a methodology.").
169 See Glenn Langenburg, Christophe Champod, and Pat Wertheim, Testing for
Potential Contextual Bias Effects during the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology
When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons, 54 J Forensic Sci 571, 571 (2009).
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these vetting professionals would be "experts on experts." Sever-
al fields have such publications.17° Ultimately, in areas in which
feedback loops are hard to develop, determining who fits in this
expert-on-experts category will depend to some extent on who
appears to be the most qualified-that is, those who are the best
educated and trained, who have the most experience, and who
most closely follow approved evaluation procedures in their eve-
ryday practice.171 If and when courts use this method of evaluat-
ing the peer review criterion in the diagnostic setting, they
should make some inquiry into this aspect of the publication
process.
4. General acceptance of the method.
Both Frye and Daubert incorporate general acceptance of
the method or theory undergirding the expert's testimony in
admissibility. Frye makes the issue dispositive, while Daubert
relegates it to the last of four factors. General acceptance can be
a useful consideration in determining admissibility of both
framework and diagnostic testimony if, as Daubert apparently
intended, courts look to experts in the relevant field rather than
merely canvass the views of other courts. 17 2
a) General acceptance of framework testimony. Framework
evidence, by definition, comes from a field of expertise, although
perhaps a very new or small one. The key difficulty here in-
volves identifying what field should be selected for review. Very
often fields are defined by self-interested practitioners or estab-
lished guilds. For example, if a court asks experts in the areas of
polygraphs, bite marks, bullet lead, or hair identification about
general acceptance, it would likely hear a chorus of consensus,
though each of these areas of claimed expertise has been thorough-
ly discredited. 173 Similarly, for example, handwriting-identification
experts are a closed society and, since their livelihoods depend on
170 For instance, medical journals often include such case studies. See, for example,
Sally Macintyre, et al, Using Evidence to Inform Health Policy: Case Study, 322 British
Med J 222, 224 (2001).
171 See Paul S. Appelbaum, Policing Expert Testimony: The Role of Professional Or-
ganizations, 53 Psychiatric Services 389, 390 (2002).
172 See, for example, Saul M. Kassin, et al, On the "General Acceptance" of Eyewit-
ness Testimony Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 Am Psychologist 405, 413-15
(2001).
173 See National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science at 150-52, 155-
61, 173-76 (cited in note 90). See also Michael J. Saks, Forensic Identification: From a
Faith-Based "Science" to a Scientific Science, 201 Forensic Sci Intl 14, 15 (2010).
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the acceptance of their expertise, few dissenting voices are likely
to be heard174 In other situations, the opposite problem occurs:
scientific evidence involves more than one academic or profes-
sional discipline. For instance, should the validity of the bat-
tered woman syndrome be assessed by asking psychiatrists, re-
search psychologists, or clinical psychologists?
Measuring general acceptance, then, largely involves a pro-
cess of deciding whose noses to count. In deciding this issue,
courts should keep in mind two basic considerations. First, they
must consult a broad enough spectrum of scientists to reach
those who are not entirely invested in the expertise. "Invest-
ment" in this context could refer to financial interests, but is in-
tended to be considerably broader, and include professional and
ideological. Professional overinvestment might include a re-
searcher who is a leading figure in the field but whose life's work
depends on acceptance of the expertise. Ideological investment
might include a researcher whose judgment about the validity of
an empirical framework will be influenced by its ability to fur-
ther a desired policy outcome. 7 5 While financial, professional, or
ideological investment should not necessarily disqualify an ex-
pert from addressing the general acceptance question, courts
should strive to get input from those whose judgments are rela-
tively free of such influence.176
The second basic consideration for courts to consider in
measuring general acceptance-one that is particularly im-
portant in framework-evidence cases-is in some tension with
the first, because it requires that those surveyed truly under-
stand the research basis for the empirical framework. Thus, for
example, while the first consideration would require courts in-
terested in the acceptance of polygraph technology to go beyond
polygraph examiners, this second consideration would require
courts to take note of the fact that other possibly knowledgeable
professionals (for example, psychologists and statisticians)
174 See National Research Council, On the Theory and Practice of Voice Identifica-
tion 68-69 (National Academy of Sciences 1979) (indicating that a group composed of
acoustical engineers, physiologists, statisticians, and others gave a less favorable as-
sessment of the technique than the narrower range of developers of the technique).
175 See Dan M. Kahan, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Donald Braman, Cultural Cogni-
tion of Scientific Consensus, 14 J Risk Rsrch 147, 157-66 (2011); Philip E. Tetlock, Greg-
ory Mitchell, and L. Jason Anastasopoulos, Detecting and Punishing Unconscious Bias,
42 J Legal Stud 83, 93-102 (2013).
176 See, for example, Katrina Rufino, et al, When Experts Disagreed, Who Was Cor-
rect? A Comparison of PCL-R Scores from Independent Raters and Opposing Forensic
Experts, 36 L & Human Behav 527, 535 (2012).
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might not be familiar with it. In some cases independent groups
of scientists, such as those sponsored by the National Academies
of Science,77 will have reviewed the validity of certain kinds of
expert testimony. But in most areas of scientific evidence, courts
will not have the benefit of such reports and will have to do their
best to examine the views of the true believers in light of what-
ever critical commentary is available from respected scholars
outside the field.
b) General acceptance of diagnostic testimony. For diagnos-
tic experts whose expertise derives primarily from scientific re-
search in their fields, evaluating the general acceptance of their
testimony will be very similar to evaluating the general ac-
ceptance of the testimony of framework experts. Thus, the points
made in the prior Section about the difficulty of delineating the
appropriate field of reference apply here as well. As with frame-
work evidence, the existence of independent bodies that have
identified, based on scientific study, best practices in the field
can be extremely useful to courts. For example, if the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences issues a consen-
sus report on how post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) should
be clinically assessed among combat veterans of the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan,178 this should go very far in determining
whether the manner in which a diagnostic expert evaluated a
criminal defendant claiming combat-induced PTSD followed a
generally accepted protocol. Of course, the expert must also
demonstrate that he or she employed the accepted protocol in
the approved manner.
General acceptance is more difficult to evaluate when the
diagnostic testimony is not explicitly research-based. In discuss-
ing the general acceptance factor in Kumho Tire, the Supreme
Court stated that "it will at times be useful to ask even of a wit-
ness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a per-
fume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff,
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field
would recognize as acceptable.179 Given the lack of quantified
177 See, for example, National Research Council, The Polygraph and Lie Detection
(National Academies 2003), online at http://www.nap.edulcatalog.php?record-id=10420
(visited May 21, 2014).
178 As it has. See generally Institute of Medicine, Treatment for Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder in Military and Veteran Populations: Initial Assessment (National Academies
2012). A second report on this topic is scheduled to be released by the Institute of Medi-
cine (IOM) in 2014.
179 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 151.
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information about experience-based diagnostic expertise, with
the concomitant difficulty of testing the resulting opinions, gen-
erating error rates, and constructing a useful peer review pro-
cess, the inquiry into general acceptance may be the most im-
portant in considering the admissibility of this type of testimony.
As always, the court must not only assure that a practice is
generally accepted but also that the practice fits the case at
hand. For instance, perhaps the diagnostic expert diligently fol-
lows a generally accepted structured interview format for de-
termining the presence of PTSD, but the precise legal issue in
the case in which he or she is asked to testify is whether PTSD
can cause a failure to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's ac-
tions. Unless the expert also resorted to a structured format for
evaluating insanity, 80 a court might justifiably decide that the
evaluation process is not one that is generally accepted for the
case before it.
5. Same intellectual rigor.
In Kumho Tire, the Court reiterated "Daubert's gatekeeping
requirement" and repeated the four factors just canvassed.s1
But, as we've noted, it also stated that judicial gatekeeping
would "make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony
upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes
the practice of an expert in the relevant field."182 This standard
has proved to be quite popular with lower courts '83 and is worth
separate consideration.
a) Same intellectual rigor in framework testimony. Because,
like the general acceptance test, it relies on practices in the rele-
vant field, the same-level-of-intellectual-rigor test presents simi-
lar dangers to those that were presented by the Frye test. If the
fields themselves are not valid, this deference leads courts to ac-
cept bad framework science. Closely related to the possibility
that a field has little intellectual rigor is the not unusual situa-
tion in which the field does not exist outside the courtroom. Most
of the forensic-identification sciences, for example, have only one
180 For such a format, see Ira K. Packer, Evaluation of Criminal Responsibility 30-
31 (Oxford 2009).
181 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 152.
182 Id.
183 See, for example, Jenkins v Bartlett, 487 F3d 482, 489 (7th Cir 2007).
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market, the law.184 For these specialties, the expert can always
testify that he or she uses the same level of intellectual rigor in
the courtroom that characterizes the practice in the relevant
field, because the two are the same.
An object lesson involving the tension between framework
testimony offered in court and professional standards comes
from the expert testimony in Pippen v Iowa,185 a class action al-
leging that Iowa's failure to monitor its state hiring system im-
properly allowed "implicit bias" to affect personnel decisions to
the detriment of African American job applicants.186 Professor
Anthony Greenwald, a well-known research psychologist, testi-
fied for the plaintiffs that "based [on] his nationwide research,
roughly three-quarters of the people able to affect hiring deci-
sions in Iowa's state government have an implicit bias that
makes them favor whites over blacks.187 When asked whether
he could "prove" that bias led to the statistically low number of
African Americans employed by the state, he stated, "I would be
reluctant to make that contention in the journal publication con-
text, because I think that requires a higher standard of proof."188
Instead, Greenwald continued, "I can say that it is plausible that
implicit bias is a cause of discrimination in the state of Iowa. I
regard that as a plausible hypothesis that I would love to test."189
Greenwald's assertion that "the journal publication context" re-
quires "a higher standard of proof' than the courtroom starkly
indicates a failure to apply in the courtroom "the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field."190
b) Same intellectual rigor in diagnostic testimony. In the di-
agnostic context, if the requirement that the expert employ "the
same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of
an expert in the relevant field" is to mean something different
184 See Daubert, 43 F3d at 1317 n 5 ("Fingerprint analysis, voice recognition, DNA
fingerprinting and a variety of other scientific endeavors closely tied to law enforcement
may indeed have the courtroom as a principal theatre of operations.").
185 No. LACL107038, slip op (Iowa D Ct Polk County, Apr 17, 2012).
186 Id at 52.
187 Jeff Eckhoff, Update: Polk Judge Rules That "Uncommon Approach" to Class-
Action Racial Bias Case Fell Short of the Law, Des Moines Register Blog (Des Moines
Register Apr 17, 2012), online at http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php
/2012/04/17/polk-co-judgerejects-class-action-lawsuit-alleging-that-state-government
-discriminated-against-blacks (visited May 21, 2014).
188 Id.
189 Id.
190 Kumho Tire, 526 US at 152.
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than is already captured by the general acceptance and peer re-
view requirements, it should focus on the quality of the expert's
analysis of whatever information the expert acquires through
his or her (generally accepted) assessment process. In this re-
gard, the "same intellectual rigor" factor is analogous to the con-
cept of custom in tort law.191 Custom in the context of tort law
means that the relevant party acted as other people-here, other
professionals-would have acted in similar circumstances.
"[C]omplying with custom confirms that the actor has behaved
in the ordinary way."192 According to Professor Kenneth S. Abra-
ham, "[a]dmitting custom evidence reflects the idea that recur-
ring patterns of conduct have a bearing on what constitutes rea-
sonable care."'193
As described earlier, it is customary in the ordinary practice
of medicine and related fields (for example, clinical psychology)
for professionals to make individual diagnostic judgments de-
rived from group-based data. Likewise, it is not customary in the
ordinary practice of sociology, epidemiology, anthropology, and
related fields (for example, cognitive and social psychology) for
professionals to make individual diagnostic judgments derived
from group-based data. 194 In the law of evidence as in tort law,
being informed of the individual inferences drawn by diagnostic
experts such as physicians and clinical psychologists
has the potential to acquaint the jury with unfamiliar fields
of activity, to place the conduct of the parties in its proper
social or economic context, and to help the jury get its bear-
ings. Custom evidence informs the jury about what happens
in the real world, and thereby may enhance the accuracy
and reliability of jury decisionmaking. 195
191 While we focus here on the use of custom in tort, custom is a central concept in
many diverse areas of law. As the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical
and Emotional Harm § 13 (2010) states, "Custom plays a powerful role in the law gener-
ally. In international law, under certain circumstances custom can be the actual source
of legal obligations. In contract law, customs are often understood to be implied terms in
individual contracts." Id at § 13, comment a.
192 Id. See also generally The Duke Project on Custom and Law (Duke University
2013), online at http://law.duke.edu/customlaw (visited May 21, 2014).
193 Kenneth S. Abraham, Custom, Noncustomary Practice, and Negligence, 109 Col-
um L Rev 1784, 1785 (2009).
194 We discuss the contrary view of Fiske and Borgida. See note 232 and accompany-
ing text.
195 Abraham, 109 Colum L Rev at 1787 (cited in note 193).
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Two problems arise in connection with this inquiry into cus-
tomary rigor, however. First, the legal query may be so unique
that experts in the relevant field never have occasion to address
it (as in our earlier example involving testimony about the etiol-
ogy of acute coronary ischemia) or so empirically fraught that
experts in the field do not believe it should be addressed (as in
the eyewitness-testimony setting). The second problem arises
when experts in the field do engage in the relevant analysis but
their inferential reasoning is opaque and thus not easily subject
to scrutiny. The Supreme Court's perfume tester might be an
example of this phenomenon.196 The question that arises here is
whether diagnostic testimony that cannot be explained should
be admissible. We earlier suggested it should be, if reliability
can be gauged through rigorous proficiency testing or a similar
procedure. Other commentators have taken a different view. 197
D. Added Value ("Helpfulness")
Even if expert testimony is material, the expert is qualified,
and the basis of the testimony is valid (the three evidentiary fac-
tors discussed to this point), it is not admissible if it does not as-
sist the fact finder in making the relevant decision. Rule 702
states that expert testimony must "help" the jury,198 and Daubert
reiterated that point.199 But expert testimony does not have to
transform the fact finder from "incompetence" to "competence"
when it comes to understanding the evidence or determining a
fact in issue. It simply has to add value, that is, make a positive
contribution to the process of determining facts.200
At the same time, helpfulness is usefully distinguished from
advocacy and argument. Expert testimony along the lines of
196 See Kumho Tire, 526 US at 151.
197 See, for example, Ronald Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What Is the
Problem?, 34 Seton Hall L Rev 1, 9 (2003) (stating that "my present view is that a person
who cannot explain the basis of testimony in an accessible fashion or explain how it can
be verified ought not be allowed to testify").
198 FRE 702:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the
expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
199 Daubert, 509 US at 591.
200 See Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, The New Wigmore § 2.1.2 at 39 (cited in note
136) (stating that expert testimony "must allow the expert to provide useful information
or perspective that the jurors do not already have").
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"here's how I would vote if I were on the jury" is not admissi-
ble.201 Neither is expert testimony that merely mimics lawyers'
arguments. 02
1. Framework testimony.
The primary added value of framework testimony is that it
provides a context in which a particular case might be under-
stood. Given our focus on G2i, this added value can be under-
stood as serving two basic purposes. The first purpose is to give
jurors a background with which they might better understand
facts in the particular case at hand. The second purpose is to
provide a subsequent expert witness with the general framework
in which to situate his or her proffered diagnostic testimony.
When framework testimony is admitted without accompany-
ing diagnostic expert testimony, its principal purpose is educa-
tive. It allows jurors to understand a facet of the world that they
know little about, or about which they might hold certain mis-
conceptions. At common law, this question concerned whether
the subject matter was "beyond the ken" of the average layper-
son.203 Modern rules of evidence have a less demanding thresh-
old for added value, but courts continue to insist that expert tes-
timony provide assistance beyond what lay jurors could do on
their own.204
Consider, for example, the phenomenon of false confessions,
which has been the subject of considerable scientific research.
Most jurors are unlikely to know about the subject and, indeed,
the phenomenon itself seems incredible. Why would anyone
falsely confess? Yet the DNA exoneration cases demonstrate that
false confessions are not infrequent.205 Framework testimony on
201 See FRE 704, Advisory Committee Notes to the 1972 Proposed Rules ("Under
Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides
for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford ample assurances
against the admission of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to
reach ... ").
202 See Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, 4 Weinstein's Federal Evidence
702-41 at § 702.03[2][al (Lexis 2d ed 2013) ("Proffered expert testimony should be ex-
cluded when it will not help the trier of fact to any degree beyond the assistance that the
lawyers representing the parties could provide during their closing arguments.").
203 See Kaye, Bernstein, and Mnookin, The New Wigmore § 2.1.3 at 40 (cited in
note 136).
204 Id at § 2.1.3 at 41 (noting that "modern evidence codifications deem even mar-
ginally helpful expert testimony potentially admissible").
205 See Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 Stan L Rev 1051,
1062-66 (2010).
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false confessions, if it otherwise satisfies the requirements of
admissibility, can appreciably assist jurors in understanding not
simply that the phenomenon exists, but also the variables asso-
ciated with its occurring.
A second function for framework evidence that might assist
jurors is to provide the general scientific basis on which later di-
agnostic judgments are made. This function might be particular-
ly necessary when the diagnostic expert is not familiar with the
underlying science or technology that he or she is applying in
the particular case, a situation that frequently occurs in forensic
and medical contexts. For example, a DNA or fingerprint identi-
fication that is based on contemporary testing techniques is like-
ly to be carried out by a technician who is generally unfamiliar
with the basic science underlying the technology, often does not
have an advanced degree, and is following a protocol created by
others.206 Courts might expect, and parties might insist, on hav-
ing a framework expert testify to the general science relating to
a diagnostic test. Similarly, framework experts might provide
added value about the efficacy of a range of other diagnostic
tests, such as IQ tests employed by psychologists, polygraph
tests used by police, and fMRI machines used by neuroscientists.
Whether those diagnostic tests are themselves needed to assist
jurors is a separate inquiry.
2. Diagnostic testimony.
The measure of whether diagnostic testimony provides add-
ed value-in other words, is helpful-in a case depends on an
expert's ability to help jurors reason from a valid empirical
framework to a valid diagnostic judgment. This is the goal, for
example, of testimony typically provided by clinicians: doctors
help jurors decide whether the ingestion of a drug known to be
associated with cancer caused cancer in the case at hand, and
psychiatrists assist jurors in deciding whether the research on
schizophrenia's effect on reasoning applies to the defendant on
trial. Sometimes this testimony is of suspect validity. Even if it
is not, it must still add value.
The situation in which this value is least likely to be present
is when the framework evidence is such a good fit with the case
206 See David H. Kaye and George Sensabaugh, Reference Guide on DNA Identifica-
tion, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 129, 134 (National Academies Press 3d
ed 2011).
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that reasonably intelligent jurors need no further assistance ap-
plying the empirical framework to the case at hand. Consider,
for instance, a case involving whether a battered woman acted
reasonably in killing her husband rather than leaving the bat-
tering relationship. If the relevant framework research indicated
that one of the factors that contributes to a failure to leave the
relationship is PTSD, a qualified psychiatrist could provide con-
siderable help to jurors by offering a diagnostic opinion on
whether the defendant suffered from PTSD, assuming the pro-
fessional carried out a proper evaluation.207 If, on the other hand,
the factors that contribute to the failure to leave are typically
nonclinical-for instance, fear for children left behind, lack of fi-
nancial resources, and a lack of safe alternatives, such as shel-
ters or nearby family-then a diagnostic expert might not be
needed.208 Presumably, a jury could determine, as well as any
expert, whether the defendant might have failed to escape the
abuse for one or more of these reasons. An opinion by an expert
on this issue would probably be akin to an argument the attor-
ney makes during closing and thus would not be helpful.
E. Exclusion on Prejudice Grounds
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and similar state rules give
trial courts the authority to "exclude relevant evidence if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or
more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence."29 Rule 403, therefore, gives
courts considerable discretion to exclude, or possibly limit the
scope of, otherwise-admissible scientific evidence, for any of the
reasons listed. In the following discussion we collect these rea-
sons under the rubric of prejudice.
1. Framework testimony.
Some types of framework evidence might be so complicated
that juries will be unable to fathom them or so duplicative or obvi-
ous that they constitute a waste of time. But the primary danger of
207 See Faigman, et al, 2 Modern Scientific Evidence at 304-06 (cited in note 137)
(describing research on association of PTSD and battered women).
208 See id at 314-15 (describing research on the correlation between these types of
factors and a battered woman's failure to leave a battering relationship).
209 FRE 403.
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framework evidence, as far as the courts are concerned, is not
that the jury will misunderstand it or disregard it but rather
that it will give the evidence too much weight. For instance,
some courts have worried that testimony about the foibles of
perception and memory will lead juries to distrust all eyewit-
nesses. 10 Courts have expressed similar concerns about frame-
work evidence relating to false confessions,211 syndromes,212 and
profiles.213 In essence, the courts decide that the relatively weak
fit of framework evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
If, however, framework evidence is material and scientifical-
ly valid, and if it adds value to what the jury could figure out for
itself, it should usually be admissible. Rule 403 permits exclu-
sion on prejudice grounds only if the prejudicial impact of the ju-
ry would "substantially outweigh" its probative value.214 Espe-
cially when cross-examination is available to point out that general
scientific information does not necessarily dispose of the individual
case, the fears expressed by these courts seem unfounded.
2. Diagnostic testimony.
The potential for diagnostic testimony to confuse, distract or
overinfluence the jury is best explored by examining the level of
inference a diagnostic expert should be allowed to reach in ex-
plaining his or her opinion to the jury. In some cases the leap
from observed facts (striations on a bullet, fingerprints on a glass,
scar tissue on a body) to final conclusions (the defendant's gun
fired the bullet, the fingerprints are the defendant's, the victim's
injury came from a knife) is relatively small. In these situations,
210 See, for example, People v Enis, 564 NE2d 1155, 1165 (Ill 1990) (upholding the
trial court's exclusion of testimony on eyewitness identification because "[i]t would be
inappropriate for a jury to conclude, based on expert testimony, that all eyewitness tes-
timony is unreliable").
211 See Commonwealth v Harrell, 65 A3d 420, 431 (Pa Super 2013) (excluding
framework testimony about false confessions because "the testimony could confuse the
issue by suggesting causal relationships which are not borne out by the research actually
conducted").
212 See Commonwealth v Seese, 517 A2d 920, 922 (Pa 1986) (excluding testimony
about the characteristics of a sexual abuse victim because it "would encourage jurors to
shift their focus from determining the credibility of the particular witness who testified
at trial, allowing them instead to defer to the so-called 'expert' assessment of the truth-
fulness of the class of people of which the particular witness is a member.").
213 See Flanagan v State, 625 S2d 827, 828-29 (Fla 1993) (holding testimony based
on "sex offender profile" inadmissible in part because "[e]stablishing that a defendant
has a certain character trait in order to show he acted in conformity with that trait on a
certain occasion is forbidden by the rules of evidence").
214 FRE 403.
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assuming the other prerequisites for expertise are met (validity,
and so on), the prejudice inquiry is relatively simple: will the ju-
ry be able to independently assess the validity of the expert's
conclusions or will the expert's credentials lull the jury into pas-
sive acceptance of whatever the expert says? The court will have
to balance the latter possibility with the likelihood that if the di-
agnostic expert is not permitted to state his or her conclusions,
but rather is confined to reporting observed facts, the testimony
will be rendered much less useful to the untrained jury. In such
cases, the helpfulness of the testimony is closely associated with
the expert's ultimate conclusions.
In other types of cases-involving, for instance, psychiatric
testimony, economic analysis, or opinions about how an accident
occurred-the connection between observed facts and final con-
clusions is more attenuated, and prejudice analysis thus be-
comes more complicated. For instance, in Clark v Arizona,215 the
Supreme Court refused to strike down an Arizona statute that
prohibited not only expert testimony focused on a defendant's
capacity to form mens rea (what might be called the ultimate is-
sue in a case in which the issue is whether the defendant had
mens rea), but also expert testimony about the defendant's di-
agnosis, or what the Court called "mental-disease" evidence
(which falls far short of the ultimate issue).216 The Court reached
this conclusion, it explained, because of the "controversial char-
acter of some categories of mental disease," and because of "the
potential of mental-disease evidence to mislead."217 Put in evi-
dentiary terms, the majority in Clark was concerned that the
fact finder might give diagnostic testimony about the defend-
ant's mental disorder undeserved weight on the related, but dif-
ferent, mens rea issue, and thus appeared to believe that preju-
dicial impact of such testimony could easily outweigh its
probative value.
The issue raised in Clark can arise in any case involving di-
agnostic testimony, because, compared to framework testimony,
diagnostic testimony is more likely to be suspect in terms of va-
lidity, at the same time its particularized nature and better "fit"
is more likely to influence the fact finder's determination in the
215 548 US 735 (2006).
216 Id at 774-76 (concluding that it is reasonable to channel "mental-disease and
capacity evidence" to the insanity issue, in which the defendant has the burden of
persuasion).
217 Id at 774.
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case at hand. The usual response to this concern is that the ad-
versarial process-cross-examination, rebuttal experts, etc.-can
correct for this problem.218 However, the majority in Clark was
not swayed by the dissent's observation that "[w]e have al-
ways trusted juries to sort through complex facts in various
areas of law."219
Whatever the correct outcome in Clark itself,220 the general
concern the Clark majority raises is worth taking seriously. Di-
agnostic experts are, by definition, extrapolating from general
scientific principles. At some point, even if their opinions are
based on vast experience and accepted protocols, they can reach
too far. When diagnostic testimony is at issue, the prejudice in-
quiry is a crucial tool for ensuring that expert testimony aids the
adjudication process. This inquiry requires close attention to
whether the testimony rests on a valid empirical framework that
permits extrapolation to an individual case, as well as the extent
to which the testimony departs from the diagnostic skills the ex-
pert is known to possess (as a result of proficiency testing or
some other measure of validity). The less supportive the frame-
work or the greater the departure from a validated diagnostic
skill set, the more attentive the court must be to the ability of
the adversarial system to expose for the jury any flaws in the
testimony.
CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING BEST PRACTICES INTO JUDICIAL
ADMISSIBILITY JUDGMENTS
As the foregoing discussion indicates, and as Daubert and
its progeny emphasized, analysis of when witnesses should be
allowed to testify as either framework or diagnostic experts ul-
timately involves balancing many factors. Courts need to con-
sider the extent to which the testimony:
(1) is material to issues in the case, that is, can be said to fit the
case both legally (as mandated by the relevant substantive
218 See, for example, Barefoot v Estelle, 463 US 880, 901 (1983) (stating that "the
adversary process" can "he trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence
and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the
opportunity to present his own side of the case").
219 Clark, 548 US at 793 (Kennedy dissenting), quoting United States v Booker, 543
US 220, 289 (2005) (Stevens dissenting).
220 See Christopher Slobogin, The Supreme Court's Recent Criminal Mental Health
Cases, 22 Crim Just Magazine 8, 12 (2007) (arguing that Clark "exaggerates the gullibil-
ity of judges and juries about psychiatric evidence; research shows that laypeople are
very skeptical about such evidence, especially when it is presented by the defense").
[81:417
G2i Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony
law) and empirically (as indicated by an assessment of
external validity);
(2) is proffered by a witness who is qualified in the relevant
field;
(3) evidences internal validity, which can be measured in
terms of the extent to which the basis of the testimony:
(a) has been subject to testing or some other verification
process; (b) can be analyzed using error rates; (c) was
developed in accordance with adequate standards; (d)
has been exposed to peer review; (e) is generally accept-
ed by knowledgeable experts in related, scientifically-
oriented fields; and (f) is the product of the type of rigor-
ous analysis expected of experts in the field;
(4) adds value (in other words, is helpful), because it pro-
vides useful information to the fact finder; and
(5) avoids misleading or distracting the fact finder.
Consistent with Daubert's cautious approach,21 these con-
siderations are intended to be guidelines, rather than strict cri-
teria or a formal checklist that can be employed in a mechanical
fashion. The admissibility decision for both framework and di-
agnostic evidence is a matter of judgment and these considera-
tions are intended as guides to that judgment, not substitutes
for it.
Nonetheless, these guidelines should be seen as a set of ju-
dicial best practices that govern admissibility analysis in three
substantive ways. First, it should be clear from the foregoing
that proffered expert testimony must meet all five of these fac-
tors in order to be admitted. Failure on any one of them should
lead to exclusion. Immaterial evidence is inadmissible regard-
less of its validity. Invalid evidence is inadmissible even if it ap-
pears to add value to the case. And so on.
At the same time, as captured by the balancing metaphor,
in those situations in which the threshold for each factor is met,
a weakness in one can be compensated for by strength in the
others. For instance, expert evidence that does not have perfect
empirical fit (because, for instance, the validation sample used
for the research did not contain people sufficiently similar to the
parties in the instant case) may still be admissible if it has high
indicia of validity; as scientists have long recognized, tradeoffs
221 Daubert, 509 US at 594 ("The inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a
flexible one.").
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between external and internal validity may (and probably must)
be made.222 Similarly, as we have pointed out at several different
points in this Article, weaknesses in connection with any one of
the indicia of internal validity may not be dispositive if other in-
dicia can pick up the slack. However, "convergent validity"-in
which most or all of the factors indicate the basis of the testimo-
ny is trustworthy-is obviously preferable and is more likely to
permit the internal-validity factor to make up for deficiencies in
the other factors.
A third aspect of these best-practice guidelines is that the
five factors they identify must be balanced separately-and dif-
ferently-depending on whether the expert is offering frame-
work evidence or diagnostic evidence. That is the crucial (and
new) point of this Article. Before summarizing these differences
and providing an example of how they might apply, we briefly
turn to the predicate issue of distinguishing between general
framework evidence and particularized diagnostic evidence.
A. Distinguishing Framework and Diagnostic Evidence
Differentiating between framework and diagnostic evidence
is fundamental to understanding the use of science in the court-
room. Most of the time, the distinction will be straightforward
and uncontroversial. Clearly, for instance, framework evidence
is being offered by the psychologist who relies on the scientific
literature in testifying that certain factors tend to produce inac-
curate eyewitness identifications or false confessions, or an epi-
demiologist who testifies, based on the research, that certain
drugs are possible causes of cancer. Just as clearly, an expert
who offers to testify that the plaintiffs birth defects were caused
by the drug in question, or that the plaintiffs tire was defective-
ly manufactured, is offering diagnostic expert testimony, even if
the expert also references general scientific research in the
course of doing so. Returning to the breast-cancer litigation ex-
ample we used at the beginning of this Article, the difference is
between an expert who says, "When factors A, B, and C are pre-
sent, all else held constant, women who do not get a mammo-
gram by age forty have an X percent chance of getting cancer in
the next five years" (a framework statement) and an expert who
222 See Monahan and Walker, Social Science in Law at 69 (cited in note 105) ("Often
a research strategy that yields results high in internal validity does so at the cost of leav-
ing external validity questions unanswered, and vice versa.").
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says, "Given what I know about Ms. Jones, including factors A,
B, and C, she had a Y percent chance of getting cancer before
age forty" (a diagnostic statement).
But some types of expert testimony are harder to classify.
Consider an expert who testifies in response to detailed hypo-
thetical questions that replicate the facts of the case, but who
has not performed any evaluation of the relevant party and has
not independently heard any evidence in the case. Is this expert
a diagnostic expert or a framework expert? Presumably the wit-
ness is relying on research in answering the hypothetical ques-
tion, but he or she is also providing very case-specific infor-
mation based on that research, albeit without the usual
evaluation process. When the hypothetical permits the expert to
drill down into the details of the particular case, and is so tai-
lored to it that, in effect, only the party's name is missing, the
testimony is diagnostic. But less detailed hypothetical question-
ing can be more difficult to classify.223
The ultimate question, of course, is whether the answers to
the hypothetical questions should be admissible. We believe the
analysis depends on how the expert responds to the question. If
the expert says something to the effect of, "On those facts, the
individual would be likely to [be insane/give inaccurate testimo-
ny/be diagnosed with cancer]," the testimony would be inadmis-
sible, unless the expert can produce scientific evidence backing
up the claim that on this set of facts the assertion is "likely"
(which in most cases will not be possible). Nor should the expert
be able to hide behind meaningless assertions of "reasonable
[medical/psychological/scientific] certainty" in answering such
questions.24 Assume, instead, however, that the expert answers
223 Compare Tillman v State, 354 SW3d 425, 428-32 (Tex Crim App 2011) (allowing
expert on eyewitness testimony to answer a string of hypothetical questions regarding:
the effect of having the defendant be the only person in a lineup who was also in a previ-
ous photo array, the effect of pointing out the defendant on the street to an eyewitness
and then putting the defendant in a lineup, the effect of working with a police artist,and
the effect of putting the suspect in a lineup when he is the only one with facial hair),
with State v Yusuf, 800 A2d 590, 607 n 12 (Conn App 2002) (allowing use of extremely
detailed hypothetical questions during direct examination of expert on battered woman
syndrome, including the number of assaults and how and when they occurred, that repli-
cated what the defendant did to the victim). We think Tillman involves framework tes-
timony and Yusufinvolves diagnostic testimony.
224 See Lewin, 57 Md L Rev at 502 (cited in note 71), concluding that the phrase
"reasonable medical certainty":
was incorporated into legal doctrine not because it best served certain in-
strumental purposes, but by virtue of the judiciary's uncritical acceptance of
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the hypothetical in the following terms: "Based on the research,
and all else being equal, the individual in the hypothetical would
be more likely to [be insane/be inaccurate/be diagnosed with
cancer] than when the stated facts are not present." This more
modest statement sets the response within an empirical frame-
work that is more likely to have scientific backing.
B. The Best-Practice Guidelines Applied
Once the distinction between framework and diagnostic evi-
dence has been made, the court must apply the five guidelines
we outlined earlier in deciding whether the evidence is admissi-
ble. The factors operate very differently depending on the level
of expert testimony being proffered. These differences, detailed
throughout this Article, are summarized here for each of the
factors.
Relevance: By definition, diagnostic testimony is more likely
to be material than framework testimony. Individualized testi-
mony will always have a better legal fit with the facts than tes-
timony based on general research findings. When it comes to
empirical fit, however, diagnostic testimony that reaches beyond
the expert's customary practice may well be irrelevant, while
framework evidence's relevance will vary widely depending upon
the underlying research's external validity.
Qualifications: A qualified framework expert will need to be
knowledgeable about the research literature, but need not pos-
sess evaluation experience or skills. Conversely, a minimum de-
gree of experience and requisite skill will usually be obligatory
for a diagnostic expert. At the same time, in contrast to the
framework expert, the latter type of expert need not always be
immersed in the background science (as with DNA technicians).
Validity: Because of its explicitly scientific nature, frame-
work evidence should be subject to the most demanding inter-
nal-validity tests. Courts should require proof of a rigorous veri-
fication process and an explanation for the absence of error rate
information. Some diagnostic expertise is subject to verification
as well, through proficiency examinations or other feedback
loops. But more often courts evaluating the scientific validity
of diagnostic testimony will need to look at how peer experts
a prevailing usage. Having no intrinsic meaning, the phrase was not especially
well-suited to its eventual dual roles as a standard of admissibility and a
standard of proof.
[81:417
G2i Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony
customarily function, with a focus on whether standard practic-
es have been developed by knowledgeable experts in the field for
dealing with the precise issue at stake in the case. In other
words, Daubert's factors, and in particular its first three, are
crucial considerations in evaluating the admissibility of frame-
work evidence, whereas Frye's focus on well-accepted protocols
and customary practice, with the caveats we have expressed in
this Article, will often be more useful in assessing the admissi-
bility of diagnostic expert evidence.
Added Value (Helpfulness): Both framework and diagnostic
testimony will most often be helpful when they educate the jury
about complicated or arcane subjects, or when they challenge
common misconceptions. But the more closely framework evi-
dence fits with the facts of the case, the less helpful diagnostic
testimony may be, because the fact finder will more likely be
able to draw its own conclusions from what it has learned via
the framework evidence. In other words, when framework evi-
dence is a good fit to the facts of the case, the fact finder, guided
by lawyers and judicial instructions, may not need the diagnos-
tic expert: the diagnostic expert will add no value to what the
framework expert has already testified to.
Prejudice: Framework evidence is most likely to be prejudi-
cial in the sense that it overcorrects (by, for instance, leading a
jury to distrust all eyewitness testimony). Diagnostic evidence is
most likely to be prejudicial the further it departs from what
framework scientists can say with a high degree of certainty. In
both cases, courts will need to assess the extent to which the ad-
versarial process can minimize these dangers, but the presump-
tion should be that it will usually be able to do so if analysis of
the other factors point in the direction of admissibility.
To illustrate how these differences would play out in an ac-
tual case, consider an example involving expert evidence about
eyewitness testimony in a criminal case. Suppose first that the
defendant offers expert framework testimony that cross-racial
identifications are less accurate on average than same-race
identifications. Regarding relevance, this testimony legally fits if
the identification involved in the case was cross-racial. Its em-
pirical fit is less obvious, since most of the research in this area
is laboratory research.225 Yet there are good reasons to believe
225 See Christian A. Meissner and John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Research on the
Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces: A Meta-analytic Review, 7 Psychology Pub Pol & L
3, 13 (2001) (describing 39 research studies, all of which involved laboratory methodology).
20141
The University of Chicago Law Review
that the laboratory research of this sort should generalize to the
wider world.226 The expert's qualifications should depend on his
or her knowledge of the research literature. Because that litera-
ture is voluminous, some experts may not be familiar with its
nuances and, for that reason, might be rejected at this stage, but
those experts who have been adequately trained should be quali-
fied to testify. Turning to the various scientific validity factors,
given the voluminous literature just mentioned the testability
criterion is satisfied, since the subject of cross-racial identifica-
tions has been extensively examined by many different teams of
researchers.227 The possible error, including the variability and
limited effect sizes, of this research are also well known.22s Most
of the research that an expert in this area would rely upon is
published in well-regarded peer-reviewed journals and those in
the field of cognitive psychology consider its findings to be well
accepted and the result of standard and rigorous methodology.229
Next to consider is the helpfulness factor. While some judges
have doubted the added value of this type of testimony, increas-
ingly courts have come to appreciate jurors' lack of appreciation
for the limits of eyewitness identifications.230 Finally, prejudice,
in particular the possibility that jurors will dismiss all cross-
racial identifications out of hand,231 might augur against admis-
sibility. But this factor is probably not substantial enough to
lead to exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence if the adver-
sarial process functions as it should. Taken together, then, the
five factors of relevance, qualifications, validity, added value,
226 Id at 27 ("Overall, the [own-race-bias phenomenon] was found to be a reliable
and generalizable phenomenon...."). See also generally Dawn E. McQuiston and Roy S.
Malpass, Validity of the Mock Witness Paradigm: Testing the Assumptions, 26 L & Hum
Behav 439 (2002) (describing research suggesting good external validity using mock wit-
nesses). But see Deborah Bartolomey, Cross-Racial Identification Testimony and What
Not to Do About It: A Comment on the Cross-Racial Jury Charge and Cross-Racial Expert
Identification Testimony, 7 Psychology Pub Pol & L 247, 249 (2001) (arguing that the
research does not translate to real-world cases).
227 See Meissner and Brigham, 7 Psychology Pub Pol & L at 21 (cited in note 225)
(discussing the results in thirty-nine research studies on cross-racial identification).
228 See id at 15-21 (describing a metareview summarizing overall effect sizes).
229 See id at 23 (describing studies from peer-reviewed journals).
230 See State v Clopten, 223 P3d 1103, 1113 (Utah 2009) (noting that "trial judges
have often excluded eyewitness experts on grounds that the testimony will not be helpful
to the jury," but concluding, to the contrary, that "[a]s the research makes clear, the top-
ics covered by eyewitness experts are often beyond the common knowledge of ordinary
jurors and usually cannot be effectively elicited through cross-examination alone").
231 See Bartolomey, 7 Psychology Pub Pol & L at 252 (cited in note 226) (Identifica-
tion experts will not help the jurors reach a rational verdict, but will muddle the issues, in-
vade the jury's province, and escalate the already considerable expense of criminal trials.").
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and prejudice largely favor admitting framework testimony on
cross-racial identifications in the ordinary case.
Suppose, however, that the eyewitness expert also offers a
diagnostic opinion on the accuracy of the witness's cross-racial
identification. The same five factors now point strongly in the
opposite direction. Although, by definition, such an opinion
would legally fit the case at hand, nothing in the expert's prac-
tice provides a foundation on which empirical fit could be meas-
ured. For related reasons, a witness could not have received
training in such clinical assessments, and so should not be quali-
fied to offer a diagnostic opinion on the issue. With respect to
both the qualification and validity issue, the claim might be
made that an eyewitness expert who has testified in large num-
bers of cases involving cross-racial identifications possesses the
"wisdom" to pinpoint when a witness who has made such an
identification is likely wrong. But experience cannot qualify as a
test of an expert's diagnostic judgment in such cases; tellingly,
neither a protocol for making these judgments nor a feedback
loop that tells experts whether their experience produces accu-
rate judgments exists. In short, diagnostic assessments are not
customary in this particular field (in contrast, for instance, to
customary practice in the medical profession).232 Moreover, the
added-value criterion strongly weighs against eyewitness diag-
nostic testimony, since once jurors hear the framework evi-
dence they can be expected to handle the inferential challenges
232 Our position here is thus directly contrary to that of Professors Susan T. Fiske
and Eugene Borgida, who are prominent proponents of allowing framework experts to
offer opinions on individual group members. They argue that the custom of limiting such
testimony to physicians and other diagnostic experts is inapt:
A sharp distinction between general and specific causation is alien to psycholo-
gists and most scientists. The ability to generalize to specific circumstances is
probabilistic, and applying knowledge in court is not different in principle from
applying scientific evidence in other contexts. However, the confidence with
which experts can generalize varies, depending on the state of available, rele-
vant science. Like physicians' ability to diagnose a patient's physical symptoms,
scientists' ability to link general and specific causation for the individual case
crucially depends on the quality of available scientific evidence and the scien-
tist's relevant expertise. Qualified social scientists who provide general, rele-
vant knowledge and apply ordinary scientific reasoning may offer informed
opinion about the individual case, but probabilistically. None of this usurps the
triers of fact of their role, as they are capable of drawing their own conclusions,
with scientific judgments as one input.
Susan T. Fiske and Eugene Borgida, Standards for Using Social Psychological Evidence
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 83 Temple L Rev 867, 875-76 (2011) (emphasis
added; emphasis omitted).
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of reasoning from the group data to the individual case 233 (a ca-
pacity that can again be contrasted to the typical medical-
causation case, in which jurors might have considerable difficul-
ty reasoning from multiple types of studies in epidemiology and
toxicology to the individual case). Finally, the prejudice associ-
ated with eyewitness diagnostic testimony, in the sense that it
could distract a jury from the scientific uncertainty inherent in
the field, probably substantially outweighs its limited probative
value.
Differential application of the five factors gleaned from
Daubert of the type illustrated by this example is crucial if
courts are to succeed at balancing the numerous legal and scien-
tific considerations that influence when general research may be
heard in court and the extent to which experts may apply that
research to help resolve specific cases. Only in this way can the
distinctions between framework and diagnostic evidence be
openly acknowledged and confronted. Unless courts develop and
refine evidentiary best practices akin to those proposed here,
they will not be able to make full use of the knowledge that sci-
ence creates and will at the same time heighten the risk that
value-laden but empirically valueless diagnostic speculation will
undermine the adjudication process.
233 See Clopten, 223 P3d at 1114 ("As long as the expert does not attempt to tell the
jury that a specific eyewitness identification either is or is not accurate, then the expert
has not impinged on the jury's duty as the sole evaluator of witness credibility.").
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